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Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely be-
cause it comes late.'
INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1992, the United States Supreme Court, in a joint
opinion handed down by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, William
Kennedy, and David Souter, announced its decision in the Pennsyl-
vania abortion case-Planned Parenthood v. Casey.2 As evidenced by
its auspicious beginning,3 the decision was rendered in the hopes of
securing a woman's "liberty" interest in the right to terminate her
pregnancy and to resolve the doubt, confusion, and controversy cre-
ated after the Court's original foray into abortion jurisprudence.4
The Casey decision purported to accomplish this by announcing its
resolute and unwavering support for the "central holding" of Roe v.
Wade. According to the joint opinion, the "central holding" of Roe v.
Wade was that: (1) a woman has the right to choose to have an
abortion before fetal viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State; (2) the State has the power to restrict
abortions after viability; and (3) the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the life of the woman
and the life of the fetus.
The justifications for the affirmation of Roe's "central holding"
were threefold. First, the Casey Court stated it was bound to reaf-
firm Roe because of the "fundamental constitutional question" in-
volved. Second, "institutional integrity" necessitated it. Lastly, and
most importantly, the doctrine of stare decisis5 required it. 6
As evidenced by the Court's justifications, the doctrine of stare
decisis and its concomitant notion of institutional integrity was a
1. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
3. The joint opinion began: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Id.
at 2803.
4. The Court's major opinion, the one which set off a storm of controversy, was the
landmark case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Black's Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as follows:
To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases. Policy of courts to stand by precedent
and not to disturb settled point. Doctrine that, when a court has once laid down
a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same .... Doc-
trine is one of policy, grounded on theory that security and certainty require
that [an] accepted and established legal principle... be recognized and followed
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (6th ed. 1990).
6. 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
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significant, if not the major, reason behind the decision to affirm
Roe. As such, an analysis of stare decisis is particularly relevant.
However, as this Note will show, stare decisis did not command Roe's
affirmance.
This article examines the Supreme Court's use of stare decisis
in the Casey decision. The article is divided into four parts. Part One
explores the historical underpinnings of the doctrine of stare decisis,
its usage and development in American law, and current applica-
tions of the doctrine by the Rehnquist Court. Part Two is an
in-depth analysis of the Casey decision and, out of necessity, an
analysis of Roe v. Wade. This section analyzes the Court's reasoning,
use, and justifications in employing the doctrine of stare decisis in
the Casey decision. Part Three explains how the Court's decision in
Casey is not only inconsistent in its own use of stare decisis, but is
also inconsistent with traditional notions of stare decisis, and with
Roe. This section compares the Casey Court's use of the doctrine
with that of its predecessors and examines the doctrine's new found
force as a decision-making tool. Finally, Part Four gauges the rami-
fications that the Court's new twist on stare decisis will have for the
future of the doctrine, Casey, and for settled and unsettled areas of
American law.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS-AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. English and American Origins
The doctrine of stare decisis is by no means of recent origin. Its
origins date back to medieval England, and the doctrine, itself, has
become the cornerstone of English common law. In actuality, the
term stare decisis is an abbreviated form of the Latin phrase stare
decisis et non quieta moevre which translates: "to stand by matters
that have been decided and not to disturb what is tranquil."7 As the
late Judge Robert Sprecher recounted, the modern doctrine of stare
decisis began to develop at the end of the fifteenth century.8
7. DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN PHRASES AND ABBREVIATIONS 187 (Kevin Guinach trans.,
3d ed. 1983). For further discussion of the modern definition of stare decisis, see Robert A.
Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It
Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 501 (1945) (defining stare decisis: "to stand by the
decisions and not to disturb settled points"); Albert Kocourek & Harold Koven, Renova-
tion of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REV. 971, 973 (1935) (defining
stare decisis: "to abide by the precedents and not to disturb settled points").
8. Sprecher, supra note 7, at 502. Sprecher notes that historians agree that Brac-
ton's Note Book, which contains one of the first collections of English decisions, dating
back to approximately 1217-1240, gave early impetus to the doctrine of stare decisis. Id.
at 501 & n.9; see also SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 146-47
(1938); A. K. R. KIRALFY, POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS
INSTITUTIONS 276-78 (4th ed. 1958).
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The doctrine was seized upon by Lord Coke and William Black-
stone. In his Commentaries, written in 1765, Blackstone stated that
"it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same
points come again in litigation."9 By the end of the eighteenth century,
the English doctrine of stare decisis was substantially in place. 10
The doctrine of stare decisis developed in England to the extent
that a judicial precedent became an authoritative or fixed and
binding rule. The doctrine mandated that precedent be followed in
three specific instances: (1) by all lower courts after promulgation by
a superior one; (2) by the House of Lords in its own prior decisions;
and (3) by the Court of Appeal in its own decisions and by those of
older courts of coordinate authority." The precedent, though per-
ceived as absolute, remained subject to three important reserva-
tions. The first was that the rule laid down in a case need not be
followed if it was "plainly unreasonable and inconvenient" (i.e., con-
trary to well established principles or statutes). 12 Second, the judge
had discretion in employing the doctrine where courts of equal
authority had created conflicting decisions. 13 Third, the binding force
was attached not to the words used, nor reasons given by a judge for
a particular decision, but to the actual principle or principles neces-
sary for the decision of the case. 4
The development of stare decisis in American law has resulted
in a major breach with its English antecedents. "The modern and
present trend is characterized by the overruling and distinguishing
of precedents to an extent that would strike an English judge and
lawyer as revolutionary."'5 That statement was made in 1937, and
while talk of "Court-packing" and "switches in time"" consumed the
day, this author believes that the Supreme Court's current use of the
doctrine would strike an English jurist as anathema.
9. WILLI BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (Thomas M.
Cooley ed., 3d ed. rev. 1884)).
10. Sprecher, supra note 7, at 502.
11. Id.; SIR JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 192-93 (8th ed. 1930); see also RUPERT
CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 104-11 (1961).
12. Sprecher, supra note 7, at 503. Indeed as Blackstone commented, stare decisis
need not be followed "when the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason
.... For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is de-
clared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law .... " BLACKSTONE,
supra note 9, at 69-70; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 152-53; SALMOND, supra
note 11, at 193-94.
13. Sprecher, supra note 7, at 503; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 153; CROSS, supra
note 11, at 128-30, 134-38.
14. Sprecher, supra note 7, at 502-03; see also ROSCOE POUND, THE FUTURE OF THE
COhimON LAw 125 (1937).
15. Kocourek & Koven, supra note 7, at 976.
16. For a brief discussion of this historical event, see infra part III.A.2.
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The American doctrine of stare decisis has always embraced the
three English reservations to stare decisis. However, the traditional
American application of the doctrine also included two additional
reservations which strengthened the hand of judicial discretion and
departed from the English notion of precedent as a voluntary but
rigidly followed rule. First, the Supreme Court has come to accept
the notion that whether stare decisis "shall be followed or departed
from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question."17 Second, the American
version of the doctrine is adaptable to the "spirit of the times."' s Fre-
quently, and perhaps no better exemplified than in Casey, judicial
use of the doctrine is tempered by judicial perceptions of the politi-
cal, economic, and social realities of the day.
These two reservations were indicative of the early twentieth
century American approach to the use of stare decisis. Since that
time, however, a number of other reservations, explanations, or jus-
tifications have received the approval of the Supreme Court. While
the additional reservations comprise a part of the traditional Ameri-
can approach to stare decisis, they do not constitute a complete and
exclusive list. Development of the doctrine has, by and large, been
evolutional.' As several commentators suggest, the doctrine of stare
decisis is in reality not one but two doctrines, comprising both a
strict and liberal rule of precedent.
According to the strict rule of precedent, a court is bound by its own previ-
ous decisions and by the previous decisions of all higher courts. There is
17. Sprecher, supra note 7, at 503 (quoting Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212
(1910)).
18. Id. at 504.
19. Admittedly, this is the author's own impression of the voluminous research that
has been done on stare decisis. Consistent with this author's approach to the subject, this
article will defer to "traditional" definitions of the doctrine and then examine the ap-
proaches taken by the Supreme Court's most prolific jurists as evidence of this evolution.
Since this article will show how the Casey Court has taken the doctrine into unexplored
territory, a precise definition of "traditional" stare decisis is not required. To the extent
that one is required, D. H. Chamberlain, in the seminal American article on stare decisis,
encapsulated the traditional American approach as follows:
A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge, made after full argument on
a question of law fairly arising in a case and necessary to its determination, is
an authority or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts of equal
or lower rank within the same jurisdiction, in subsequent cases where the very
point is again presented; but the degree of authority belonging to such prece-
dent depends, of necessity, on its agreement with the spirit of the times or the
judgement of subsequent tribunals upon its correctness as a statement of the
existing or actual law, and the compulsion or exigency of the doctrine is, in the
last analysis, moral and intellectual, rather than arbitrary and inflexible.
D. H. Chamberlain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis as Applied to Decisions of Constitutional
Questions, 3 HARV. L. REV. 125, 125 (1889).
1994]
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no provision made in this theory for the departure from or alteration of a
rule that has been previously asserted and followed. The only valid justifi-
cation for refusing to apply the rule is that the fact situation of the present
case is not controlled by the rule, i.e., is not subsumable under the class
delineated by the antecedent of the rule.
... The liberal rule... is one which therefore allows for flexibility and
growth; under its dictates precedents need not always be followed. The
doctrine... allows for both definite expectation and innovations .... And
if the judge should conclude that the prior cases were wrongly decided-
that the precedents are incorrect-then the cases should be openly over-
ruled. For if the rule of stare decisis demanded that precedents be fol-
lowed regardless of the amount of good or harm produced in society by so
doing, then this rule might be open to the objection that certainty is being
procured at too great a price.
20
B. Stare Decisis and the Supreme Court
The development of the doctrine of stare decisis is best exem-
plified through its treatment in the Supreme Court. Throughout the
history of the Court, many Justices have felt the need to explicate
the doctrine, both on and off the bench. In so doing, the doctrine of
stare decisis has come to embrace additional considerations and jus-
tifications. These include: diminished force, reliance, court legiti-
macy and public confidence, administrative efficiency, and judicial
restraint.
1. Diminished Force. The doctrine of stare decisis has never
meant that subsequent courts are absolutely barred from overruling
precedent. This was true both for English and American courts.21
Indeed, the Supreme Court has had a long history of overruling its
own precedents 2 This is especially true in cases where the Court is
confronted with a constitutional, as opposed to statutory precedent.
20. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 50-51 (1969); see also JOHN
R. SCHMIDHAUSER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 505-07 (1963); KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (1960); David L. Shapiro, Essays Commemorating
The One Hundredth Anniversary Of The Harvard Law Review: In Defense of Judicial
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 734 (1987).
21. See supra notes 12-14, 17-20 and accompanying text.
22. There have been numerous attempts by commentators, judges, and Congress to
count the total number of cases which have been overruled by the Court. As the
1991-1992 term indicates, this number is in continual flux. As of the date of the Casey
decision, the count stood at 216. See BriefAmicus Curiae of Hon. Henry J. Hyde et al. in
support of Respondents, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos.
91-744 and 91-902) (listing 214 implicit and explicit overrulings by the Court to date)
[hereinafter, Casey, Briefi. The Casey Court overruled two previous decisions. Also, the
brief shows that in nearly three-fourths of these cases, the Court overruled the earlier
decision because the previous Court wrongly interpreted the Constitution.
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In the former case, stare decisis applies with diminished force.
No discussion of the diminished applicability of stare decisis to
constitutional questions would be complete without a reference to
Justice Brandeis-one of the first American jurists to state such a
proposition. Justice Brandeis, in his stinging dissent in Burnett v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,' called for the overruling of an established
precedent, arguing that:
Stare decisis is not.., a universal and inexorable command. "The rule of
stare decisis... is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed
from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided." Stare decisis is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right. This is com-
monly true even where error is a matter of serious concern, provided cor-
rection can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Con-
stitution where correction through legislative action is practically impos-
sible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing
that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate in the judicial finction.2 4
Justice Brandeis' concerns were predicated upon his belief in
the difficulty of amending the Constitution.' The appropriate
weight precedent should receive thus depends upon whether a con-
stitutional or statutory issue is involved. When the Court refuses to
overrule constitutional precedent, it becomes extremely difficult to
correct an erroneous or unjust decision. Since legislative correction
is constitutionally impermissible, the only way to correct an errone-
ous decision would be through the amendment process.26 In essence,
"the practice of judicial review requires that constitutional questions
remain open to interpretation because only the Court can correct its
23. 285 U.S. 393 (1932).
24. Id. at 405-08 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
25. Passage of a constitutional amendment requires approval of two-thirds of both
houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of all fifty states. U.S. CONST. art. V.
The enactment of the 27th Amendment perhaps best underscores the difficulties inherent
in the amendment process. This amendment, originally included in the Bill of Rights, was
not enacted until May 1992, more than 200 years after it was first introduced. See, e.g., J.
Jennings Moss, House, Senate OKAmendment, WASH. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A3.
26. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICES
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 102 (1985); ROBERT H. BORE, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 155-57 (1990); PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE
SUPREME COURT 72-73 (1949); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be
Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L.
REV. 345, 350-53 (1986); Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, "Overruling" Opinions in
the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151, 183 (1958). But see Earl M. Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, 471
(arguing that Brandeis' argument is overstated).
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own mistakes given the laborious nature of the amendment pro-
cess."27 Conversely, Court error with respect to a statutory precedent
may be remedied simply by Congressional legislation."
As Professor Maltz explains, the prevailing dogma, at least
since the days of Chief Justice Roger Taney, was that the Supreme
Court should feel "more free to overrule constitutional decisions
than non-constitutional precedents." 29 In constitutional cases, once
the Court has ruled upon the constitutionality of a law or precedent,
Congress cannot amend it. To do so would violate the Constitution
and the power of judicial review. 0 Thus, the only practical way to
overturn a decision of the Court on a constitutional issue is if the
Court does so itself." If the Court is to be absolutely constrained by
stare decisis, then judicial correction of erroneous decisions is fore-
closed. The only other alternative, constitutional amendment, is so
laborious and infrequent that it is impractical and dangerous to rely
on it as the sole means of correcting judicial error.32
Justice Brandeis' concerns in Burnett were seized upon by Jus-
tices Stone and Cardozo in St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v. United
States.33 In a concurring opinion, both Justices agreed that "[t]he
doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and even necessary at
27. Parisis G. Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil
Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 351 (1991);
see also Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National
League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMIENTARY 123, 127 (1985); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role
of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 77
(1991).
28. See generally Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congres.
sional Response To Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 425-29
(1992).
29. Maltz, supra note 26, at 467. But see Lewis F. Powell Jr., Stare Decisis and Ju-
dicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286 (1990) (arguing that wrongly decided
cases should be overruled equally in both the statutory or constitutional cases); ARTHUR
J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREIIE COURT 74-75 (1971)
(suggesting that when a court rules to expand personal liberties adherence to stare decisis
is diminished; however, adherence to stare decisis is absolute, when a court seeks to con-
tract them).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78
(1803).
31. U.S. CONST. art. V.
32. Only four Supreme Court decisions have been overruled by amendment, Chisolm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (11th amendment); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857) (13th and 14th amendments); Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust, 157
U.S. 429 (1895) (power to lay direct taxes), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
523 (1988); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (26th amendment); see also Casey,
Brief, supra note 22; TRIBE, supra note 26, at 102-03.
33. 298 U.S. 38, 93 (1936) (Stone, J., with whom Cardozo, J., joins concurring); see
also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921) (agreeing
that adherence to precedent should be relaxed when it is necessary to bring a ruling in
line with society's current sense ofjustice).
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times, has only a limited application in the field of constitutional
law."34 Justice William 0. Douglas agreed, stating that:
The place of stare decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A
judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above
all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend,
not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it .... He cannot do
otherwise unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the problem of the
age in which he lives do his thinking for him.35
Justice Robert H. Jackson went even further:
[F]or over a century it has been the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court
that the principle of stare decisis has only limited application in constitu-
tional cases. It might be thought that if any law is to be stabilized by a
court decision it logically should be the most fundamental of all law-that
of the Constitution. But the years brought about a doctrine that such de-
cisions must be tentative and subject to judicial cancellation if experience
fails to verify them. The result is that constitutional precedents are ac-
cepted only at their current valuation and have a mortality rate almost as
high as their authors.36
Expanding upon the laborious nature of the amendment process,
Justice Jackson noted:
Of course, such judicial misconstruction theoretically can be cured by con-
stitutional amendment. But the period of gestation of a constitutional
amendment, or of any law reform, is reckoned in decades usually; in
years, at least. And, after all, as the Court itself asserted in overruling the
minimum-wage cases, it may not be the Constitution that was at fault.
3 7
In addition to the problems inherent in the amendment proc-
ess, there is another reason to be wary of rigid adherence to stare
decisis in constitutional cases. This danger is that the resolution of a
constitutional issue is left to the first Court that is presented with
the issue. Aside from the fact that times can change, there also ex-
ists the possibility that the first Court is poorly prepared, the case is
poorly argued, or the judgment is poorly considered. This danger be-
comes even more acute when a court has moved too far in an activist
34. 298 U.S. at 93.
35. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949); see also
GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES THAT THEY MAKE 217-40
(1964) (discussing factors that influence judges' attitudes toward stare decisis).
36. Robert H. Jackson, The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of the Ju-
diciary, 39 A.B.A. J. 961, 962 (1953) [hereinafter Jackson, Maintaining Our Liberties]; see
also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY IN CRISIS IN
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 297 (1941) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE].
37. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE, supra note 36, at 297.
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2. Reliance. One of, if not, the most frequently invoked reasons
for adherence to precedent is the notion of reliance. The essential
argument is this: if society has relied upon a certain legal rule, it
should n6t be overturned. As Professor Wasserstrom notes, "the
failure to give effect to those activities and commitments which were
undertaken in justified reliance upon the pronouncements of that
system could serve, arguably, only to make the legal system
ill-conceived, irresponsible, and vicious." 9 Thus, when it can be
shown that great numbers of people have committed and relied upon
judicial rules, the argument is that the Court should adhere to the
prior decision even if it was erroneous. °
The importance of reliance, as certain commentators have sug-
gested, has even led the Supreme Court to render what it considered
to be wrong decisions rather than overrule incorrect ones.41 For ex-
ample, it is generally accepted that precedents upholding the New
Deal and Great Society programs 42 and the Legal Tender Cases"
were wrongly decided, yet they have become immune to reversal be-
cause public and private expectations, as well as governmental and
societal institutions, have been created based upon a belief in the
lasting validity of these precedents. Overturning these precedents, it
38. Maltz, supra note 26, at 493. When the Court moves in an activist direction, it is
susceptible to the charge that the Court is violating the doctrines of separation of powers
and judicial review by attempting to "make law" and not interpret it. If the Court does so,
stare decisis will ensconce this arguably unconstitutional decision into the law.
39. WASSERSTROM, supra note 20, at 67.
40. See Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 374.
41. Blaustein & Field, supra note 26, at 179 (citing Helvering v. Griffiths as one such
example). Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson stated, "[tlo rip out of the past seven
years of tax administration a principle of law on which both Government and taxpayers
have acted would produce readjustments and litigation so extensive [that] we would con-
template them with anxiety .... [Therefore], a long period of accommodations to an older
decision sometimes requires us to adhere to an unsatisfactory rule to avoid unfortunate
practical results from a change." Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 403 (1943).
42. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding Congressional power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the power of Congress
to apply the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to local restaurants pursuant to the Commerce
Clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding Congressional regulation of
the production of wheat by an individual farmer on a family farm pursuant to Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (upholding the power of Congress to enact the National Labor Relations Act);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding New York's regulation of milk
prices).
43. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), overruled by Knox v. Lee, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (holding that the legalization of paper money constitutionally
permissible); see infra part III.A.5.
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is believed, would send governmental and societal institutions into
chaos.44 Before a precedent acquires this reliance interest, however,
it is usually required that the decision be subject to political and so-
cial acceptance, as well as time.
As Professor Wasserstrom notes, "under no circumstances
would the fact of reliance alone permit the inference that a good rea-
son has been furnished for having a legal system which ought al-
ways to follow precedent."45 The permanency of such decisions will
usually depend upon the amount of controversy surrounding the is-
sue and the extent to which political pressure has mobilized against
it. If hostile political forces are able to organize against a controver-
sial precedent, the reliance interest is weaker as a substantial por-
tion of the populace considers the precedent to have been incorrectly
decided. If such opposition and criticism persists, the ability of the
remainder of the populace to rely upon that decision is diminished.
This is so because continued and vehement opposition to a Court
ruling may compel the Court to reexamine, if not overrule, the prior
decision.46 However, the less controversial the decision, the more in-
grained it becomes. Over time, the lack of opposition coupled with
political acceptance creates a reliance interest. It is this type of reli-
ance interest that makes even erroneous precedents immutable.47
Traditionally, the Court has been most sympathetic to economic
or industrial reliance interests. Thus, cases governing the financial
affairs of government, states, or taxpayers are more readily adhered
to than departed from. Creating an atmosphere of stability and con-
tinuity, where reasonable expectations can be met, has historically
been an important consideration for the Court, as well as fundamen-
tal to our market economy.48 However, the Court has historically
44. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 27, at 88-89; BORK, supra note 26, at 158.
45. WASSERSTROM, supra note 20, at 69.
46. The classic example of this is the repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Gerhardt, supra note 27, at 87-90.
48. CHARLES S. HYNEMtAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 230 (1963); Henry P.
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 749-52
(1988); Powell, supra note 29, at 286; see also Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S: 371, 403
(1943) (interpreting the tax code in a manner consistent with the taxpayer's and Treas-
ury's reasonable expectations); ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFr TO
WARREN 194-95 (1958).
The Rehnquist Court has been particularly vocal in its support for this proposition.
See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2261 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (upheld continued use of the unitary business principle as
an appropriate method for determining whether a state has acted unconstitutionally by
taxing nondomicilliary corporations); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S.
Ct. 560, 564 (1992) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (precedent showed that Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act (FELA) applies to state owned railroads); American Trucking Ass'n
v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that the
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been less willing to embrace social or private reliance interests. Such
a reliance argument was best articulated by Justice Arthur Gold-
berg, who stated that the dictates of stare decisis become absolute
when the "Court seeks to overrule in order to cut back the individ-
ual's fundamental, constitutional protections against governmental
interference."49
Thus, while the Court has upheld the validity of some ques-
tionable cases, because these were relied upon by large numbers of
people (what I will refer to as "societal reliance"), these decisions are
basically limited to the economic arena (i.e., Congressional power
under the commerce, taxing, and spending clauses). Indeed, as the
authors of the joint opinion noted in Casey, the classic case for
Court's prior decision in Scheiner, which held unapportioned flat highway use taxes vio-
lated the commerce clause, applied prospectively only); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490,
498 (1990) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (provisions of the Federal Power Act which
protected state laws relating to specific water uses from supersedure, did not apply to
state's minimum stream flow requirements); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 818 n.5 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion) (recognizing the reliance interest of
municipalities in ordering their financial affairs); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2861-62 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (discounting
social reliance as a traditional notion of reliance, and the amount of social reliance actu-
ally at stake in Roe); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
majority opinion) (discounting reliance interests in cases involving procedural and evi-
dentiary rules); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2298-99 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring and dissenting in part) (discounting reliance interests with respect to state
sovereignty from individual court action); Bendix AutoLite Corp. v. Midwesco Inc., 486
U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (an Ohio statute tolling a statute of limi-
tations for time during which a person or corporation is not present in the state violates
the Commerce Clause); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1915 (1992)
(Stevens, J., majority opinion) (Congress' ability to pass Commerce Clause legislation
relative to state's power to tax commerce supports adherence to stare decisis); United
States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527 (1975) (White, J., majority opinion) (upholding the rule
that the paramount rights to the offshore seabed inhere in the United States as an inci-
dent of national sovereignty as confirmed by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953); Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S 747, 786-87 (1986) (White, J. dissenting) (stare decisis
should not be the only constraint on judicial decision-making, "expressed will of the peo-
ple call other considerations into play"), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992).
But see SCHUBERT, supra note 35, at 219. Schubert states that the "search for a static
stability-in the law or elsewhere-is misguided." Id. He argues: "The fact is that security
can only be achieved through constant change, through the wise discarding of old ideas
that have outlived their usefulness .... Even for the experts law is only a prediction of
what judges will do under a given set of facts-a prediction that makes rules of law and
decisions not logical deductions but functions of human behavior .... The decisions of
yesterday or of the last century are only the starting points." Id.
49. GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 74; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 494, 558 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that "to overturn a constitu-
tional decision that secured a fundamental personal liberty to millions of persons would
be unprecedented in our 200 years of constitutional history").
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weighing reliance interests is virtually limited to the commercial
context.50
3. Court Legitimacy and Public Confidence. This justification
for the doctrine of stare decisis was most aptly stated by Robert Bork
in a 1971 article in the Indiana Law Journal.5 1 Bork's argument
justifting the doctrine of stare decisis is as follows: the Court's con-
tinued ability to function effectively as the ultimate arbiter of consti-
tutional law depends upon the willingness of the public to accept the
Court in this role. This acceptance, in turn, depends upon the public
perception that in each case the majority of the Court is speaking for
the Constitution itself rather than simply for five or more lawyers in
black robes.52 Similarly, the respect given by the other branches of
government to the decisions of the judiciary rests in large part on
the belief that the Court is not composed of judges who do little but
effectuate their own moral and political views through the judicial
process. Rather, their respect is predicated upon a view that the
Court is a body vested with the duty to exercise judicial power only
within the confines of the Constitution. An important aspect of this
belief is the respect that the Court shows for its own previous opin-
ions.
The public is most likely to retain confidence in the impartiality
and consistency of the Court's decision-making if the reasons for the
Court's choices are persuasive and in conformity with the rule of
law.53 As with the invocation of reliance arguments, however, the
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
51. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1971).
52. Id.
53. See Powell, supra note 29, at 286-87; Gerhardt, supra note 27, at 78; MASON, su-
pra note 48, at 200. At the heart of the concern for court legitimacy and public confidence
lies what is best known as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." That is, "when the Su-
preme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected execu-
tive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people [exercising] control, not on
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1986).
The Supreme Court exists almost at odds with democracy. The Justices' role as
life-tenured, unelected final arbiters of constitutional disputes is characteristically un-
democratic. The public's acceptance of the Court in this role is conditioned upon the pub-
lie's perception that the Court pronounce its decisions in accordance with law and not
will. Such a concern is traced back to Alexander Hamilton who explained that the Court
is truly the "least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution" because the judici-
ary "has no influence over either the sword or the purse. .. and can take no active reso-
lution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment...." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Implementation of court judgments depend mainly upon the public's willing-
ness to accept the court in this role, and "ultimately upon the aid of the executive
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Court must determine whether the advantages of overruling a
precedent outweigh the disadvantages of keeping it before it can in-
voke a system-legitimacy justification to explain its use of stare de-
cisis. This justification supports the use of stare decisis "only to pre-
vent disruption of practices and expectations so settled, or to avoid
revitalization of a public debate so divisive, that departure from
precedent would contribute... to a failure of confidence in the law-
fulness of fundamental features of the political order."54
Court legitimacy and the building of public confidence are,
without a doubt, essential to the rule of law. However, concern for
these can be taken to extremes. While the Court must be sensitive to
notions of legitimacy and confidence, these sensitivities must not
distract the Court from its responsibility to faithfully interpret the
Constitution and the laws of the land. Quite often, this duty is at
odds with public opinion. Nevertheless, as Justice Jackson re-
marked:
The judge who would resolve uncertainties of interpretation by conscious
deference to public opinion will find new pitfalls in his path .... To the
extent that public opinion of the hour is admitted to the process of consti-
tutional interpretation, the basis for judicial review of legislative actions
disappears.
55
4. Administrative Efficiency. The "administrative efficiency" ar-
gument for adhering to stare decisis has best been explained by Jus-
tice Cardozo: "[Tihe labor of judges would be increased almost to the
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case,
and one could not lay one's own secure bricks on the secure founda-
tion of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.""6 Few
cases that reach the Supreme Court are easy; most involve hours of
study and reflection, voluminous briefs and testimony, and decisions
can usually go either way. It would be impossible to require the
Court to reexamine every relevant precedent each time it comes up.
Thus, stare decisis allows judges to dispose of cases by resort to
precedent, enabling them to turn their attention towards new and
unresolved questions of law."
In this regard, stare decisis has become an indispensable tool
arm...."Id.
54. Monaghan, supra note 48, at 750.
55. Jackson, Maintaining Our Liberties, supra note 36, at 964. The late Justice
Thurgood Marshall would disagree with Justice Jackson's statement. Several of Justice
Marshall's opinions have endorsed a flexible or sliding scale approach to constitutional
adjudication. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330 (1972) (recognizing that as public
opinion changes, the validity of court precedent would have to be reexamined).
56. CARDOZO, supra note 33, at 149.
57. See Powell, supra note 29, at 286; Sprecher, supra note 7, at 506.
[Vol. 42200
STARE DECISIS
for limiting the Court's agenda. In a very real sense, stare decisis
works "behind the scenes" to guide the Court's certiorari process. At
the outset of each case, the Court must decide whether or not the
case presents a new or unresolved judicial question. If resort to
precedent will dispose of the case, then certiorari will be denied.
While the denial of certiorari is not necessarily a final judgment, it
is a judicial recognition that the matter can be reconciled under ex-
isting precedent.5 8 By virtue of the principles underlying stare deci-
sis, many constitutional issues "are so far settled that they are sim-
ply off the agenda." 9
5. Judicial Restraint. Pursuant to constitutional separation of
powers theory, the federal government is divided into three co-equal
branches of government. The legislative branch is vested with the
power to make law;6" the judicial branch has the power to interpret
law;61 and the executive branch is given the power to enforce the
law.6 2
It is both the province and duty of the judge to interpret the law
and not make it. 63 Thus, stare decisis restrains an individualistic,
idiosyncratic, or activist judge from injecting his or her own personal
mores and beliefs into the law. The doctrine requires the judge to
follow precedent rather than fashion his or her own rule. The advan-
tages of stare decisis are thus two-fold: (1) it acts as an effective re-
straint upon the commission of error in that it compels a judge to
utilize and employ the reasoning and decisions of predecessors, and
(2) prevents the infusion of bias and personal preferences. While this
argument is valid only if the original judge was free from bias and
error, in the abstract at least, it provides for correct decisions. Stare
decisis in this regard, serves as a straitjacket, preventing future
justices from abuse and derogation of law.'
C. Stare Decisis in the Rehnquist Court
While it may be true that stare decisis is neither an inexorable
command nor a mechanical formula, 5 use of the doctrine by the Re-
58. See Gerhardt, supra note 27, at 78.
59. Monaghan, supra note 48, at 744.
60. U.S. CONsT. art. I.
61. U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II; see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 46
(1825) (holding that "[the difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law").
63. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874); Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849); BoRm, supra note 26, at 5.
64. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 20, at 75-79.
65. See supra notes 12-14, 17-20, 24 and accompanying text.
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hnquist Court has become quite mechanical. When confronted with
divergent precedent, for example, the Justice who seeks to overrule
the prior decision will routinely look to certain authorities to support
his or her decision. This process usually involves categorizing the
current case as ripe for reversal (i.e., as precedent erroneously de-
cided, unsound in principle, or unworkable in theory) and then cit-
ing one or two leading cases which have dispensed with precedent
for exactly the same reason. Thus, while most Justices will disavow
using any particular formula in analyzing precedent, in reality most
will routinely apply a "they-did-it-so-I-can-do-it" approach to stare
decisis.
All nine current Justices, at one time or another, have recog-
nized that stare decisis applies with diminished force in constitu-
tional as opposed to statutory cases.66 Similarly, all nine Justices
66. For opinions in which Justice Blackmun joined or rendered, see the following
cases. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2089 n.29 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., majority opinion) (declaring that stare decisis is authoritative in antitrust
case); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (Patterson I), 485 U.S. 617, 620 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stare decisis supported application of civil rights law to private
acts of racial discrimination); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 164 & n.47 (1984) (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins, dissenting) (critical of
majority's departure from stare decisis relative to federal court jurisdiction over state
agencies); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 558 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stare decisis should not be abandoned given
people's belief "that they possess an unabridgeable right to undertake certain conduct," in
this case, abortion).
For opinions in which Justice Kennedy joined or rendered, see the following cases.
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1991) (Kennedy, J., ma-
jority opinion) (applies to state-owned railroads); Patterson v. Mclean Credit Union
(Patterson II), 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (no special ba-
sis existed for departing from stare decisis in civil rights case); see also Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, J., with whom Kennedy, J., joins in
plurality opinion) (stare decisis not authoritative in abortion case law since precedent had
proven "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice") (citation omitted).
For opinions in which Justice O'Connor joined or rendered, see the following cases.
California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1990) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (stare
decisis should control interpretation of administrative regulation controlling hydroelectric
power project); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
458-59 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stare decisis should not have compelled majority
to strike down anti-abortion city ordinance since the stare decisis "framework is clearly an
unworkable means of balancing" personal and societal interests), overruled by Planned
Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., majority opinion) (stare decisis should not have compelled majority to strike down anti-
abortion city ordinance since the stare decisis "framework is clearly an unworkable means
of balancing" personal and societal interests); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (stare decisis afforded criminal defendant protec-
tion from double jeopardy).
For opinions in which Justice Rehnquist joined or rendered, see the following cases.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670 & n.14 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion); Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna, 406
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have recognized or endorsed departure from precedent when the
prior decision has proved erroneous, unsound, or without constitu-
tional foundation.'
U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); General Atomic v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 19
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
818 n.5 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joins dissenting);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion)
(citation omitted); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
majority opinion).
For opinions in which Justice Scalia joined or rendered, see the following cases. Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1922-24 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(Congress' ability to pass Commerce Clause legislation relative to state's power to tax
commerce supports adherence to stare decisis); Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680,
2686 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (stare decisis relative to Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence is not controlling when that precedent is recent and seems to be inconsistent
with other decisions); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672-73 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
For opinions in which Justice Souter joined or rendered, see the following cases.
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Our considered prac-
tice [has] not [been] to apply stare decisis as rigidly in constitutional cases."); Bray v. Al-
exandria Women's Health Clinic, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 833, 116-17 (1993) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (recognizing stare decisis's increased force in statutory cases); St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2765-66 (1993) (Souter, J., with whom, Blackmun, J. and Ste-
vens, J. joins, dissenting).
For opinions in which Justice Stevens joined or rendered, see the following cases.
Patterson I, 485 U.S. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 & n.34 (1986) (Stevens, J., majority opinion); Thomas v.
Washington, 448 U.S. 261, 272 & n.18 (1980) (Stevens, J., majority opinion); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 713 (1978); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
189 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 104 &
n.6 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bray v. Alexandria's Women's Health Clinic, 1993
U.S. LEXIS at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For opinions in which Justice Thomas joined or rendered, see the following cases.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2766 (1992) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2860-61 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., with
whom Thomas, J., joins, concurring and dissenting in part); see also Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847 (1992) (Thomas, J., majority opinion).
For opinions in which Justice White joined or rendered, see the following cases. Ir-
win v. Veteran's Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 459 & n.3 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part);
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (White, J., majority opinion) (holding
that stare decisis weighs heavily in statutory construction); City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818 & n.5 (majority opinion); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515,
527 & n.9 (1975) (White, J., majority opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., with whom White, J., joins dissenting);
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (1992) (White, J., majority opinion)
(holding stare decisis has particular strength when Congress can alter the result); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
67. For opinions in which Justice Blackmun joined or rendered, see the following
cases. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., majority opinion) (stating that the Court has never felt constrained by stare decisis
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"when it has become apparent that a prior decision has departed from a proper under-
standing of congressional power under the Commerce Clause"); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 293 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (showing a
willingness to abandon "[tihe Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence because it is
not supported by history or sound legal reasoning"); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 519-21 (1987) (Brennan, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins
dissenting) (showing a willingness to abandon stare decisis when a precedent has proven
unstable, has no historical foundation, or lacks a textual anchor).
For Justice Kennedy's position see the following: Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991) (Kennedy, J. joined and concurring in part) (holding that stare decisis did not re-
quire the Court to follow prior precedent thus allowing the court to overrule Booth v
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)).
For opinions in which Justice O'Connor joined or rendered, see the following cases.
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that "when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent") (quoting Smith v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)); Cali-
fornia v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 499 (O'Connor, J., majority opinion); Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, 115, (1985) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (arguing in light of stare decisis and
congressional intent that "voluntariness" is a legal question meriting independent consid-
eration in a federal habeus corpus proceeding); see Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. at 568 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For opinions in which Justice Rehnquist joined or rendered, see the following cases.
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978), overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420
U.S. 358 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion) (finding that stare decisis did not pre-
clude overruling Jenkins since a constitutional question was presented); Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32 & n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 352-53 (1936)); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at
518 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion); Vasquez, Warden v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 269
(1986) (Powell, J., with whom Rehnquist , J., joins dissenting) (noting that "badly rea-
soned" decisions may be departed from).
For Justice Scalia's position, see the following sources. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Ca-
nards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 597 (1990); Ger-
hardt, supra note 27, at 124-27; see also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823-25
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (implying that there is a violation of the judicial oath when
the judge adheres to precedent which the judge believes to be wrongly decided).
For an opinion in which Justice Souter joined, see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct,
2597, 2617-19 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (showing a willingness to depart from prece-
dent which he believed to be "wrongly decided").
For opinions in which Justice Stevens joined or rendered, see the following cases.
Welch v. Texas Highways & Pub. Transp. Dep't, 483 U.S. at 519 (Brennan, J., with whom
Stevens, J., joins dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing that Justice White "is of
course correct in pointing out that the Court 'has not hesitated to overrule decisions, or
even whole lines of cases, where experience, scholarship, and reflection demonstrated
that their fundamental premises were not to be found in the Constitution'"); see Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring) (showing a willingness to depart
from a long line of cases that he fir-mly believes "to have been incorrectly decided").
In Casey, Justice Thomas joined both Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's
concurring and dissenting opinions which called for the overruling of Roe because the
case had been erroneously decided. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855-73
(Rehnquist, CJ., with whom Thomas, J., joins concurring and dissenting); id. at 2874-85
(Scalia, J., with whom White & Thomas, JJ., joins concurring and dissenting).
For opinions in which Justice White joined or rendered, see the following cases.
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In terms of approach, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens,
Kennedy, and Souter each appear to accord substantial weight to
precedent. Each of these Justices treats the precedent as creating a
rebuttable presumption that should be adhered to, unless the pre-
sumption can be overcome by special justifications. Thus, despite
recognizing that stare decisis applies with diminished force in con-
stitutional cases, each of these Justices will still require some articu-
lable reason or special justification68 before overruling. Of course,
the criteria for what constitutes "special justification," necessarily
varies from Justice to Justice.69 The effect, however, of emphasizing
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 787
(White, J., dissenting); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. at 1922 (White, J., concur-
ring and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court has not been "adverse to overruling
our precedents under the Commerce Clause when they have become anachronistic in
light of later decisions"); see also David A. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Con-
stitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 802-03 (1986) (detailing Justice White's
"interpretive mistake" theory by using stare decisis to overrule erroneous precedent).
68. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 164-65 (Stevens,
J., with whom Blackmun, Marshall & Brennan, JJ., join, dissenting); Patterson I, 485
U.S. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Vasquez, Warden v. Hillery, 474 U.S. at 266
(Marshall, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins, majority opinion); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. at 563-64 (Kennedy, J., majority
opinion); Patterson II, 491 U.S. at 172 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Arizona v. Rum-
sey, 467 U.S. at 212 (O'Connor, J., majority opinion); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. at
2617-18 (Souter, J., concurring); see Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Justice Blackmun, for example, will in some cases require more than
"articulable reasons" before departing from precedent. When confronted with precedent
that has established or expanded personal liberties, he adopts a Goldberg-type analysis,
characterizing the decision to overrule as a "rare and grave undertaking" which he is
unwilling to make. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 558
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyneclo-
gists, 476 U.S. at 771; see also GOLDBERG, supra note 29.
Justice Kennedy's overrulings will generally permit departure from precedent only
when consonant with Court practice (i.e., when precedent has become "unsound in prin-
ciple" or "unworkable in practice"). Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S.
Ct. at 2261 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, J., with whom Kennedy, J., joins in a plurality opinion); see
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. at 563-64 (Kennedy, J., majority
opinion); Patterson II, 491 U.S. at 172-74 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
Justice O'Connor's threshold for what constitutes a "special justification" is not as
strict as Justice Kennedy's. She has recognized that persuasive arguments can be made
for overruling precedent where there has been a sufficient intervening change in the law,
where adherence to precedent has fostered confusion and inconsistency in the law, where
the Court gives no guidance to lower courts, and where precedents conflict. See Richard
A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice
O'Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 398-402 (1985); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 499
(O'Connor, J., majority opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter has been credited with writing the lengthy section on stare decisis in
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the "special justifications" required is that little more than lip serv-
ice is paid to the traditional notion that stare decisis applies with
diminished force in areas of constitutional law.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia also approach
precedent as creating a rebuttable presumption. Their presumption,
however, is that an erroneous precedent is ripe for reversal. In ana-
lyzing constitutional precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist will accord
it diminished stare decisis effect. While many Justices speak of
"special justifications" in determining whether to overturn constitu-
tional precedent or not, ° Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach is "less
constrained.""' Additionally, his threshold for overruling precedent
Casey. See, e.g., Anita Allen, Roe May Not Be Dead, But It's Life Has Been Altered,
N.J.L.J., July 13, 1992, at 22; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling Court
Opinion; The Ruling's Words Are About Abortion, But They Reveal Much About the
Authors, July 1, 1992, at Al(1); Justice Souter, Out from the Egg, ECONOMIST, July 4,
1992, at A30(1). As his opinion in Casey indicates, Justice Souter's approach to precedent
involves a balancing test in which the he employs "a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the
ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a
prior case." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808 (joint opinion). Justice
Souter notes that the proper inquiry involves whether a rule has proved unworkable in
practice, whether overruling would upset substantial reliance interests, whether the old
rule is anachronistic, or whether there has been subsequent changes of fact. Id. at 2808-
09.
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, has articulated his criteria for overruling as fol-
lows:
[T]he question whether a case should be overruled is not simply answered by
demonstrating that the case was erroneously decided and that the Court has
the power to correct its past mistakes. The doctrine of stare decisis requires a
separate examination. Among the questions to be considered are the possible
significance of intervening events, the possible impact on settled expectations,
and the risk of undermining public confidence in the stability of our basic rules
of law.
John P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion)
("Since we deal with a constitutional question, we are less constrained by the principle of
stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law."); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Ilmportant decisions of constitutional law are not
subject to the same command of stare decisis as are decisions of statutory questions.");
Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Since Levy was a
constitutional holding, its doctrine is open to later re-examination to a greater extent
than if it had decided a question of statutory construction or some other non-constitu-
tional issue."); General Atomic v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 19 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Unless inexorably commanded by statute, a procedural principle.., should not be kept
on the books in the name of stare decisis . . . "); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. at 818 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joins dissent-
ing); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority
opinion); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. at 2609-11 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion).
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is significantly lower than the other Justices.72
Similarly, Justice Scalia accords diminished stare decisis effect
to constitutional precedent, and appears more apt to overrule prior
decisions.7" In fact, Justice Scalia maintains a presumption in favor
of overruling what he considers to be erroneous precedent. Overcom-
ing this predilection, while difficult, is not impossible. v4
Justices White and Thomas, unfortunately, are not neatly
classified into any particular group. Justice White's jurisprudence,
for example, suggests that he is more likely than any other justice to
adhere to the principle of stare decisis, even when it goes against his
natural inclinations."75 He has exhibited a particular disdain for
what he perceives to be precipitous overrulings, and prefers to
"reconcile our prior decisions rather than hastily overrule...
them."76
72. For example, while the Chief Justice notes that the Court has never felt bound
to follow precedent where the precedent is erroneous, wrongly decided, "unsound in prin-
ciple," or "unworkable in practice," he has expanded upon these propositions substan-
tially. He has taken the liberty to limit the effect of stare decisis in closely divided cases,
or in cases in which there were vigorous dissenting opinions. See United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
32 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (overruling precedent decided "by a closely di-
vided court unsupported by the confirmation of time"); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion); Vasquez, Warden v. Hillery,
474 U.S. at 269 (Powell, J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joins dissenting); Payne v. Tennes-
see, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion) (noting prior precedent could be
overruled, because they "were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents
challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions").
73. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1942 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part); Harmelin v Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(implying a violation of the judicial oath when the judge adheres to precedent which the
judge believes to be wrongly decided in order to save face); Gerhardt, supra note 27, at
125; Scalia, supra note 67, at 597.
74. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Gerhardt, supra note 27,
at 125. For example, stare decisis alone would be insufficient to uphold a hypothetical
statute passed today permitting public flogging, even if it could be proved that "cruel and
unusual punishment" did not include such treatment at the time the Eighth Amendment
was passed. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861
(1989).
75. Bruce A. Green, 'Power, Not Reason Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the
Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 411-12 n.212
(1992).
76. RAV v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2551 (1992) (White, J., concurring); Irwin v.
Department of Veteran's Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1990) (White, J., concurring in
part); see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 462 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); Kar-
cher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 766 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Fulimante,
111 S. Ct. 1246, 1254 (1991) (White, J., majority opinion). Justice White is critical of
courts which use stare decisis as a smoke screen to overturn unanimous, or nearly
unanimous, precedent. Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363, 383 (1977)
(Marshall, J., with whom White, J., joins, dissenting); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
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Justice Thomas' views on stare decisis are not entirely clear.
Testimony given at his confirmation hearings indicates that his the-
ory of stare decisis creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of ad-
hering to precedent.7 However, his voting record, thus far, places
him closer to Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's line of
reasoning.78 In recent opinions, Justice Thomas has indicated that
he is not opposed to overruling decision which he feels have been
wrongly decided. 9
Thus, while each Justice might claim to not apply stare decisis
with any mechanical formula, each has routinely invoked two of the
doctrine's fundamental tenets. First, the doctrine of stare decisis
applies with diminished force in areas of constitutional law. Second,
a precedent may be departed from when the prior decision has
proved erroneous, unsound, or without constitutional foundation. In
the Casey decision, an analysis of these two fundamental considera-
tions is glaringly omitted.
11. ABORTION AND STARE DECIsIs
Planned Parenthood v. Casey80 is the Supreme Courts most re-
cent major case on abortion, and the first case to directly reevaluate
the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade.8 Abortion cases prior to
U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (White, J., msjority opinion).
77. During his confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas stated:
I think of course overruling a case is a very-or reconsidering a case is a very
serious matter. Certainly the case would have to be-you would have to be of the
view that the case is incorrectly decided. But I think even that is not adequate.
There are some cases that you may not agree with that should not be overruled.
Stare decisis provides continuity to our system. It provides predictability, and in
our process of case-by-case decision-making, I think it is a very important and
critical concept.
Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee Morning Session Subject: The Nomination of
Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, September 13, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW file.
78. In Casey, for example, Justice Thomas joined in both Chief Justice Rehnquist's
and Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinions which called for the reversal of
Roe v. Wade. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855, 2873 (1992); see also
Marcia Coyle, New Trio Stands Up Tp Court's Hard Right, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at
S1, S2 [hereinafter Coyle, New Trio]; Marcia Coyle, Court Confounds Observers, NAT'L
L.J., July 13, 1992, at 1, 40 [hereinafter Coyle, Court Confounds Observers]; Linda
Greenhouse, Slim Margin: Moderates On Court Defy Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
1992, § 4, at 1; Terry Tang, Muddying the Legal Waters-At Odds: The U.S. and Its
Court-As Positions Shift, Ideological Balance Remains Uneasy, SEATLE TIMES, July 5,
1992.
79. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903, 913 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Helling v. McK-
inney 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Casey, while recognizing the fundamental right announced in Roe,
avoided or declined to reconsider the Court's decision in Roe. It is,
therefore, appropriate to begin this discussion with Roe.
A. Roe v. Wade
In March 1970, a pregnant single woman (alias Jane Roe),
brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of sev-
eral Texas criminal abortion laws. These laws outlawed the pro-
curement or performance of abortion except on medical advice, and
even then only for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.82
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, struck down the abor-
tion laws as comprising unconstitutional abridgments of a woman's
right to privacy. While unwilling to pin down the exact location or
nature of the privacy right, Justice Blackmun found it "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy."83 However, Justice Blackmun conditioned this
broad right with an important caveat: "[t]he privacy right in-
82. Id. at 120-21.
83. Id. at 153. To the extent that the right of "personal" or "zones" of privacy existed
under the Constitution, it existed in a combination of the following: U.S. CONST. amend. I
(prohibiting government interference and protecting a citizen's "free exercise" of speech,
religion, press, and assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (recognizing the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting federal deprivation of a citizen's right to
life, liberty, or property without due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (reserving
rights not enumerated in the Constitution to the people); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(assuring the privileges and immunities of each citizen and his or her right to be secure
from State deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law as well as the
right of each person to equal protection of the laws); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (recognizing a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" interest in the right of teachers to
teach and of students to acquire knowledge); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (recognizing the "liberty" of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (recognizing the incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights' guarantees which-involve "the very essence of a scheme of or-
dered liberty" into the Fourteenth Amendment and making them applicable to the
States); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a compulsory steriliza-
tion law and recognizing that marriage and procreation are fundamental to the survival
and existence of the human race); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S 158 (1944)
(concluding that religious freedom does not include the right to harm the community or,
more specifically, to expose a child to health risks or death); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) (striking down a Connecticut prohibition on the use of contraceptives and the giv-
ing of medical advice in the use of such devices); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (recognizing the existence of a "zone" of privacy for married couples to use contra-
ception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's miscegenation
statutes as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (expanding on Griswold by recognizing the right
of all individuals to be free from any unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision of whether to bear or beget a child).
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volved... cannot be said to be absolute."8
As the Court recognized, the woman's right to abortion was
tempered by the State's "important and legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant woman... and the potentiality of
human life."85 The Court found both of these interests-the woman's
interest in terminating her pregnancy and the State's interest in
protecting the woman and fetus-to be separate and distinct. "Each
grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a
point .during pregnancy, each becomes compelling."86 This "point,"
the Court determined, was viability.8 7
To govern these competing interests the Court proceeded to set
up what has since been termed a three-part or trimester test. Dur-
ing the first trimester (up to approximately the third month of preg-
nancy), "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."8
During this period, which is prior to viability, the State has no com-
pelling interest in regulating abortion. The woman is free to procure
an abortion, and the physician is free to conduct the abortion
"without regulation" and "free of interference" from the State. 9 Dur-
ing this period, the interests of the woman in terminating her preg-
nancy are supreme, and the interests of the State in protecting the
life of the mother, or health of the fetus, are not compelling.
It is not until the second trimester (covering the period after
the first trimester and up to the point of viability) that a State's in-
terests are recognized. During the second trimester, a State is
permitted to regulate the abortion procedure only to the extent that
the regulation "reasonably relates to the preservation and protection
of maternal health."90 It is only the interest in preserving the health
of the mother in terminating her pregnancy that is recognized as
"compelling."9
It is not until the third trimester (the point after fetal viability,
occurring at approximately twenty-eight weeks) that the State's in-
terests in protecting the fetus become "compelling." During this pe-
riod, the State may "regulate, and even proscribe abortion except
where it is necessary, according to appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life and health of the mother."92
84. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
85. Id. at 162.
86. Id. at 162-63.
87. Id. at 164.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 164.
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Thus, under Roe, a woman has a fundamental right to termi-
nate her pregnancy, and regulations abridging this right are subject
to strict scrutiny.9 3 That is, state regulations abridging this right
will be upheld only if the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve a
compelling governmental objective, and the means chosen are the
least restrictive way to effectuate that goal. This was the state of the
law on January 22, 1973. Over the next nineteen years, the Supreme
Court proceeded to befuddle its abortion jurisprudence, creating so
much confusion that it ultimately became necessary to revisit Roe.
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey94
The Court, in Casey, was presented with five provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, which impose several
restrictions on abortions. Section 3205 requires that a woman give
informed consent before undergoing an abortion, requiring specifi-
cally that she be provided with certain information at least
twenty-four hours before the abortion.95 Section 3206 requires that a
minor seeking an abortion obtain the informed consent of at least
one parent; however, the section provides for a judicial bypass pro-
cedure in some cases. Section 3209 requires that a married woman
seeking an abortion sign a statement indicating that she has noti-
fied her husband; however, this section also provides for some ex-
ceptions.97 Sections 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f) impose certain re-
porting requirements on facilities performing abortion services.98
Section 3203 defines a "medical emergency" that excuses compliance
with the foregoing requirements.9
Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners-0 0
consisting of five abortion clinics and one physician representing
himself and all other physicians similarly situated-filed suit in the
District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District
Court declared all five of the provisions to be unconstitutional, and
entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the regula-
tions. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part, upholding all of the provisions except section
3209 (the husband notification provision). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to resolve the controversy generated by
93. Id. at 156.
94. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
95. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1993).
96. Id. § 3206.
97. Id. § 3209.
98. Id- § 3207(b), 3214 (a),().
99. Id § 3203.
100. 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
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Roe's progeny, provide guidance to federal courts and state legisla-
tures, and confront challenges to the continuing validity of Roe. 10'
After dispensing with procedural formalities, the Court issued
a rare joint opinion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter. The decision handed down was fragmented. The
O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter faction was joined at various points in the
opinion by combinations of additional Justices. Consequently, a
majority of the Court upheld the right of a woman to have an abor-
tion (O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter and a combination of Blackmun and
Stevens); and most of the Pennsylvania provisions restricting that
right (O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter and a combination of White, Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and Thomas). As the joint opinion endeavored to prove,
the "central holding" of Roe had to be reaffirmed for three reasons:
(1) the fundamental constitutional question involved; (2) notions of
institutional integrity; and (3) stare decisis.
According to the joint opinion, Roe's "central holding" consisted
of three separate principles:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abor-
tion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the
State. Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to sup-
port a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to
the woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirma-
tion of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman's life or
health. And third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus that may become a child.10 2
After discussing these principles, the joint opinion then at-
tempted to determine the applicability of Roe's central holding to the
facts of Casey. First, they affirmed that the constitutional protec-
tions surrounding a woman's decision to procure an abortion are
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In so doing, the Court declared the doctrine of "substantive due
process" to be "settled." °3 The Court also recognized that the
boundaries of substantive due process are not susceptible to simple
rules. Rather, "[tihe inescapable fact is that adjudication of sub-
stantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting
the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition
courts have always exercised: reasoned judgment.""4 Using such
judgment, the Court concluded that the Roe Court properly invoked
101. Id. at 2804.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2805-06.
104. Id. at 2806 (emphasis added).
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the reasoning and tradition of its precedents" 5 in concluding that a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is a "'liberty' protected
against state interference by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 6
The Court, then, in various combinations and coalitions, and
sometimes without a majority, concluded the following:
" Although Roe has engendered a great deal of controversy and opposi-
tion, it has not proven unworkable.
10 7
* Roe could not be overruled without grave harm to people who, for the
last twenty years ordered their thinking and living, "have organized
intimate relationships, and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society in reliance on the availability of
abortion should contraception fail." 08
" Roe fits in well with those cases exemplified by Griswold, and subse-
quent constitutional developments have not disturbed or diminished
the liberty recognized in those cases.
10 9
" No change in Roe's factual underpinnings has made its central holding
obsolete. Although advancement in medical technology has and will
continue to push the viability line back towards contraception as op-
posed to birth, this goes only to the scheme of time limits on the reali-
zation of competing interests. The fact remains that viability is still the
key test and central holding of Roe. 110
" Roe fits in well with two decisional lines of cases of comparable signifi-
cance; namely, Lochner-West Coast Hotel and Plessy-Brown. Unlike
those cases which were over-turned because the factual bases of the
earlier decisions had proved untrue, society understood and compre-
hended such changes, and there had been a subsequent weakening of
the earlier decisions, this was not the case with Roe. In reality, to over-
rule Roe would seem nothing more than a present doctrinal disposition
to decide Roe differently as an original matter.
111
* Overruling Roe would violate stare decisis and compromise Court le-
gitimacy. When, as here, the Court seeks to resolve intensely divisive
controversies, a prior decision is entitled to rare precedential force.
Thus, only the most convincing justification would permit its repudia-
tion. To do otherwise, to overrule "under fire," would ruin public confi-
105. See supra note 83.
106. 112 S. Ct. at 2797.
107. Id. at 2809.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 2810-11.
110. Id. at 2811-12.
111. Id. at 2812-14. The cases to which the Court refers are: Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), which was repudiated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which was overruled by Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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dence and damage Court legitimacy and the rule of law.
1 12
* To protect the two interests recognized in Roe, the undue burden test
should be applied. Under this test, only those restrictions which impose
a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking an abortion be-
fore the fetus attains viability will be declared invalid. 3
" Roe's rigid trimester framework is rejected. 114
" The State has a valid interest in potential life throughout the preg-
nancy and may take measures to ensure that a woman's choice to have
an abortion is informed. Such measures are permissible at any stage as
long as they do not constitute an undue burden.
115
" As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to pro-
tect the life of the mother as long as such regulations do not constitute
an undue burden.
116
" Adoption of the undue burden standard does not disturb Roe's central
holding that it is the woman's ultimate decision to terminate her preg-
nancy before viability.
1 17
" Roe's holding that a State may regulate and even proscribe abortion af-
ter viability is affirmed.
118
" All of the Pennsylvania restrictions, except sections 3209 and
3214(a)(12) (requiring spousal notification and reporting) do not consti-
tute an undue burden, and are therefore constitutional." 9
" To the extent that the Supreme Court decisions in City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Reproductive Health Services120 and Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists12 1 repudiate the State's important
interest in potential life, they are overruled.
122
The Court began its inquiry into the effect of stare decisis upon
Roe by noting that: "[tihe obligation to follow precedent begins with
necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit."123 The
112. 112 S. Ct. at 2814-16.
113. Id. at 2820-21.
114. Id. at 2818.
115. Id. at 2821.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2804, 2811-12, 2821.
119. Id. at 2822-33.
120. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (upholding Roe's fundamental right to abortion and strik-
ing down parental consent, informed consent, and hospitalization requirements under
strict scrutiny), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992).
121. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (upholding Roe's fundamental right to abortion and strik-
ing down informed consent and reporting requirements under strict scrutiny), overruled
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992).
122. 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
123. Id. at 2808.
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joint opinion then took note of Justice Cardozo's efficiency theory
and the dichotomy of stare decisis.24 At one extreme is the belief
that precedent is indispensable, at the other is a recognition that
precedent is dispensable "if a prior judicial ruling should come to be
seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason
doomed."'2 The joint opinion then set off in pursuit of a happy me-
dium.
The Court analyzed the case under the doctrine of stare decisis
to determine whether or not it would be permissible to overrule Roe
v. Wade. With that objective in mind, the Court delineated the scope
of the stare decisis inquiry. In so doing, the Court was required to
decide four questions.
The first question was whether Roe's central rule had proven
unworkable. The second question required the Court to decide if
Roe's central rule on state power could be removed without serious
harm to those people who have relied upon it. Third, the Court had
to decide whether subsequent changes in the law had left Roe a
doctrinal anachronism discounted by society. Lastly, the Court had
to conclude whether or not Roe's factual underpinnings had ren-
dered its central holding irrelevant or unjustifiable. 2 This inquiry
comprised what the Court referred to as the "normal" stare decisis
analysis.
Under the normal stare decisis inquiry, the Court concluded
that Roe passed muster.2 This "normal" stare decisis analysis re-
sulted in the following:
1. A recognition that under the standard articulated in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,12 the Court's decision in Roe had
in no sense proven "unworkable."129 While Roe has required continual ju-
dicial assessment of state abortion laws, and the Casey Court's decision
will continue this requirement, it is not beyond judicial competence to
124. Id.; see supra notes 20, 56 and accompanying text.
125. 112 S. Ct. at 2808.
126. Id. at 2808-09.
127. "Within the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis ... the stronger argument
is for affirmingRoe's central holding. .. ." Id. at 2812.
128. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Garcia Court affirmed Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause to enforce the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act against the states in areas of traditional governmental functions. Id. at
546-47. In so doing, the Court overruled an eight year old precedent essentially because
the decision had proven "unworkable" and "inconsistent" in practice. Id. The Court noted
that "[w]e have not hesitated [to overrule] when it has become apparent that a prior de-
cision has departed from a proper understanding of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause." Id. at 557.
129. 112 S. Ct. at 2808. This inquiry into workability, the Casey Court stated, was
also predicated by Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965). Id.
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apply the Roe standards. 3 0
2. A recognition that under the standard articulated in Payne v. Ten-
nessee,13 1 people have, for the past two decades since Roe, so organized
their thinking, activity, relationships, and lives around the availability of
abortion should contraception fail that overruling Roe has become impos-
sible.
132
3. A recognition that under the standard articulated in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union,13 3 no evolution of legal principle had weakened
Roe's doctrinal underpinnings. 1' No development in constitutional law
has rendered Roe obsolete, regardless of whether one classified Roe as an
extension of the Griswold line,135 the Cruzan line,1
3 6 
or as sui generis.13 7
130. Id. at 2809.
131. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). The Payne Court affirmed the admission of victim im-
pact statements during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. In so doing, the Court
overruled two precedents, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), essentially because the precedents were "wrongly decided,"
and the cases involved constitutional precedent which had been afforded diminished stare
decisis effect. Id. at 2610-11. The Court noted that in cases involving property and con-
tract rights, reliance interests are usually at their acme and require adherence to stare
decisis. Id. at 2610. However, the Payne Court did not apply reliance interests with equal
force because the case merely involved procedural and evidentiary rules. Id.
132. 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
133. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The Patterson II Court held that title 42 of the United
States Code, section 1981, prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of private employment contracts. Id. In so doing, the Court refused to overrule Runyon v.
McRary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) essentially because of the special force with which stare de.
cisis applies in the statutory context. Id. at 173-74. Absent an intervening development in
the law or conceptual weakening, the Court would not overturn statutory precedent. Id.
134. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
135. Id. This line of cases recognizes a substantive due process "liberty" interest un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Additionally,
the Court offered Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(striking down a state law forbidding advertisement of contraceptives) and Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down an East Cleveland housing ordinance limit-
ing occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family) as further evidence that
the substantive due process "liberty" interest had not been weakened. Id.
136. Id. This line of cases recognizes "liberty" interests for personal autonomy and
bodily integrity. The Court intimated that Roe could be placed along this line of cases as
well, citing. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (affirming a
State's application of a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a
guardian seeks to discontinue lifesaving medical treatment of an incompetent and, in the
process, recognizing a competent person's right to die [refuse lifesaving hydration and nu-
trition]); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that forcible removal by
police of two capsules swallowed by defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)
(affirming the power of States to enact compulsory vaccination laws). Id.
137. Id. at 2810-11. If classified as sui generis, the Court concluded, Roe's central
holding has not been overruled by examining: City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive
Health Services, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (upholding Roe's fundamental right to abortion
and striking down parental consent, informed consent, and hospitalization requirements
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4. A recognition that under the standard articulated by Justice Bran-
deis in his dissent in Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,"s8 no change of
facts has made the application or justification of Roe's central holding
meaningless. Furthermore, even on the assumption that Roe was in error,
the error would only strengthen the state interest in fetal protection.
13 9
The Court found that in a less significant case, the normal stare
decisis analysis would have ended here. 140 However, the widespread
debate and controversy surrounding the abortion issue, and the
Court's treatment of it, required the Court to go further. The abor-
tion debate, this "intensely divisive controversy," required a more
searching analysis.141
For this reason, the Court felt the need to compare the abortion
controversy with what it identified as two other instances in Ameri-
can judicial history that had generated similar controversy. These
two cases were the Lochner-West Coast Hotel and the Plessy-Brown
lines of cases.
In Lochner v. New York, 4 2 the Supreme Court struck down a
New York State law that prohibited bakers from being required to
work more than ten-hours a day. In striking down this state health
protection measure, the Court reasoned that such action was beyond
the state's legitimate area of regulation and violative of the "freedom
of contract" principle inherent in the Constitution.
In the opinion of the Casey Court, by the time West Coast Hotel
repudiated Lochner, "the facts upon which the earlier case had
premised a constitutional resolution of social controversy had proved
to be untrue and history's demonstration of their untruth not only
justified but required the new choice of constitutional principle that
under strict scrutiny); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986) (upholding Roe's fundamental right to abortion and striking down in-
formed consent and reporting requirements under strict scrutiny); and Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (abandoning the Roe trimester framework
and strict scrutiny). Id.
138. 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (denying Congress' power, under the Taxation Clause, to
tax income derived from certain state leases), overruled by Helverina v. Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376 (1938). The Burnett Court refused to overrule Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
U.S. 501 (1922), which was later overruled by Helverina v. Producers Corp., because the
facts of the Burnett case could not be distinguished from the facts of the Gillespie case. Id.
at 398. In dissent, Justice Brandeis stated that he would overrule Gillespie, essentially
because of the diminished force with which stare decisis applies in the constitutional con-
text. Id. at 406-07, 410-11. In expressing his preference for overruling, Justice Brandeis
showed a willingness to discard precedent which had been subsequently abandoned or
factually altered. Id.; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
139. 112 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
140. Id. at 2812.
141. Id. at 2812, 2815.
142. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
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West Coast Hotel announced." While conceding that the West Coast
Hotel Court "lost something" by its lack of foresight, which was
magnified by the Court-packing crisis, the reality was that the Court
found that "the facts of economic life were different from those pre-
viously assumed," and this "warranted the repudiation of the old
law." 144
In Plessy v. Ferguson,45 the Supreme Court upheld a state law
requiring segregation of the races on public transportation. The
Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a state could provide "separate but equal" fa-
cilities for blacks.146
In the opinion of the Casey Court, the Court in Brown v. Board
of Education based its decision to overrule upon changed circum-
stances or mistaken assumptions. By the time Brown was decided, it
was clear that legally sanctioned racial segregation stigmatized
black school children with a "badge of inferiority." Thus, society's
understanding of the facts upon which the Plessy decision was based
had changed so much that its overruling was not only justified but
required. 47
Applying these interpretations of West Coast Hotel and Brown,
the Casey Court felt that the circumstances surrounding these deci-
sions were clearly not present in Roe. In Brown and West Coast Ho-
tel, the Supreme Court was responding to facts, or an understanding
of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifica-
tions for the earlier constitutional resolutions. 148 The joint opinion
stated that these decisions were not simply victories of one doctrinal
school over another, nor the result of headcounting, 4m but the prod-
uct of society's realization that the factual bases that Plessy and
Lochner were decided upon, had ceased to exist.
By the time of West Coast Hotel and Brown, the people of the
day, or at least the "thoughtful part of the Nation" found that it
"could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to
143. 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
144. Id. For an explanation of the Court packing crisis, see infra part III.A.2.
145. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
146. Id. at 550.
147. 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
148. Id.
149. The term "headcounting," as used in this paper, refers to the numerical and
ideological makeup of the Court. If, for example, the Court is composed of four conserva-
tive and four liberal Justices, the appointment of one more conservative Justice can lead
to a victory by headcounting. This type of victory is, by no means, unusual. As Justice
Scalia noted in South Carolina v. Gathers, "[o]verrulings of precedent rarely occur with-
out a change in the Court's personnel." 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Court's constitutional duty."150
Unlike West Coast Hotel and Brown, where a terrible price
would have been paid by adhering to stare decisis, the Court, in
Casey, reasoned that the terrible price would be paid by overruling
Roe. This "terrible price," was the Court's perceived damage to its
institutional integrity that would result from an overruling of Roe.
Overruling Roe, the joint opinion argued, would weaken the Court's
authority and legitimacy. "The Court's power lies.., in its legiti-
macy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation's law means and to declare what it demands."'5 ' The underly-
ing sources of this legitimacy are found in the Constitution and in
the "lesser sources of legal principle" (Court opinions and contempo-
rary understanding) on which the Court draws to make its decisions
in cases like Roe and Casey.'52 When confronted with an intensely
divisive issue, the Court must go to great lengths to ensure that the
decision is grounded in principle, not pressure. Only these decisions
will be accepted by the nation. This does not mean that the Court
may never correct error, but that it should avoid, or steer clear of,
overruling "intensely divisive issues" (i.e., abortion). It is these types
of overrulings, of failure to follow stare decisis, that run the risk of
Court illegitimacy and destruction of public confidence.
The Court went further and asserted that when it is asked to
resolve intensely divisive issues,'53 its ultimate decision acquires
"rare precedential force" to encounter the inevitable attempts and ef-
forts to overturn it or thwart its implementation. Therefore, only the
most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent
would permit a future Court to overturn such a decision, lest that
Court appear to be doing nothing more that overruling "under fire."'54
The Court concluded its analysis of stare decisis, and its reso-
lution of Roe here. The joint opinion emphatically maintained that
there was absolutely no requirement to decide Roe as an original
matter. Such an analysis, they argued, was foreclosed under stare
decisis 55
III. CASEY AND STARE DECISIS
"The opinion is at war with itself. And an opinion so divided
150. 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
151. Id. at 2814.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2815 (listing only two such occasions: racial segregation in Brown and
abortion in Roe).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2816-17.
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cannot last."156 The Court's decision in Casey has been met with
criticism from both sides of the abortion controversy. Supporters of
the pro-choice movement applaud the Court's reaffirmation of a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, but decry the Court's
"undue burden" test in its support for State regulation of abortions.
The sentiment from the pro-life movement is outrage over the
Court's continuing support for the right of a woman to terminate a
human life. Their only consolation is, however, that States are left
free to impose obstacles in the path of a woman seeking abortion so
long as they are not "undue."
While both sides have been able to claim victory and defeat,
what many have missed throughout the whole ordeal is Casey's
menacing impact, not on abortion, but on the rule of law. It is upon
the rule of law where Casey is so pernicious. 157 This opinion is des-
tined to have deleterious effects upon abortion jurisprudence, stare
decisis, the rule of law, and other controversial issues in American
law.
A. Casey's Internal Inconsistencies
1. Moral Relativism. The joint opinion emphatically declared
that while some of the Justices felt abortion offensive to the most
basic principles of morality, they would not allow their feelings or
opinions to control their decision. It is not, they argued, the obliga-
tion of the Court to "mandate [its own] moral code."58 An examina-
tion of the opinion, however, shows that this is exactly what they
did.159
This is no better illustrated than in the Court's affinity for
"reasoned judgment" and "lesser sources of legal principle."160 In at-
tempting to ground the underlying foundation of Roe into law, the
joint opinion stated that "[tihe inescapable fact is that adjudication
of substantive due process claims may well call upon the Court in
interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which
by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its
156. Bruce Fein, Court Sets Precedent Over Truth, USA TODAY, July 6, 1992, at A10.
157. See, e.g., Anita Allen, The Politics of Precedent, THE RECORDER, July 7, 1992, at
7; Robert H. Bork, Again a Struggle for Soul of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at
A19; Anthony J. DeVito, Unholy Alliance, N.Y.L. J., July 17, 1992, at 2; Bruce Fein, Casey
Plurality Presents a Menace to the Rule of Law, CONN. L. TRIB., July 6, 1992, at 22; Tho-
mas Sowell, Court Politicians, FORBES, Aug. 3, 1992, at 76; The Case Against Casey, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 27, 1992, at 7 [hereinafter The Case Against Casey]; Lisa G. Zucker, Casey
Hardly Pro-Choice, N.J.L.J., July 20, 1992, at 15.
158. 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
159. See, e.g., Sowell, supra note 157; The Case Against Casey, supra note 157; Fein,
supra note 157.
160. 112 S. Ct. at 2806, 2814.
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boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule."161
Additionally in explicating the populace's support or belief in the
legitimacy of the Court, the joint opinion held that the underlying
substance of this legitimacy is "warrant for the Court's decisions in
the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which
the Court draws."'62
The joint opinion's embrace of these concepts is troubling. Use
of so-called "reasoned judgment" and "lesser sources of legal princi-
ple" can be seen as nothing more than a departure from the Court's
duty to interpret laws and not to make them. Reasoned judgment
and lesser sources of legal principle are little more than justifica-
tions for a value-laden approach to constitutional decision-making.
These notions prove fertile ground for the imposition of a judge's
own moral or political views, or at the very least, the Court's inter-
pretation of what "society's" mores and beliefs require or will en-
dure.
2. Circular Reasoning and Questionable Interpretation. The
joint opinion's spin on the Plessy-Brown and Lochner-West Coast
Hotel lines of cases is little more than circular reasoning. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist aptly noted in his dissent, "[t]his is at best a fee-
bly supported, post hoc rationalization for those decisions." 6 ' Addi-
tionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "it appears very odd indeed
that the joint opinion chooses as benchmarks two cases in which the
Court chose not to adhere to erroneous constitutional precedent, but
instead enhanced its stature by acknowledging and correcting its er-
ror, apparently in violation of the joint opinion's 'legitimacy princi-ple.,"164
In fact, the joint opinion's treatment of the Lochner-West Coast
Hotel and Plessy-Brown line of cases is questionable, if not tortured
interpretation. While it is no doubt true that in West Coast Hotel
"the facts upon which the earlier case [Lochner] had premised a
constitutional resolution of social controversy had proved to be
untrue," 65 the joint opinion would have us believe that this was the
real reason why Lochner was abandoned. 66 This is untrue.
In reality, the "change" which brought about a reversal of
Lochner was threefold: (1) no longer could it be argued that the
"invisible hand of economics" would adequately protect workers and
161. Id. at 2806 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 2814 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 2864.
164. Id; see supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.




maximize profit;167 (2) a repudiation of error committed by the Loch-
ner/Adkins Courts, and the vindication of Justice Holmes dissent in
Lochner, that the Constitution does not embody a particular eco-
nomic theory or "liberty to contract;" 16 8 and (3) Justice Roberts'
change of mind.
Indeed, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his opinion in
Casey, the joint opinion's embrace of West Coast Hotel is not only
interpretively questionable, but flies in the face of the joint opinion's
"legitimacy" and "intensely divisive" arguments. "It is difficult to
imagine a situation in which the Court would face more intense op-
position to a prior ruling than it did at [the time of West Coast Ho-
tell."169
In the wake of the Great Depression, President Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt made it abundantly clear that he would use all of the
powers of the federal government to lift the country out of depres-
sion. 0 In the early 1930's, President Roosevelt pushed through
Congress a massive amount of "New Deal" legislation' 7 '-the corner-
stone of his economic recovery package. Although the New Deal leg-
islation sped through Congress, it ran up against a brick wall in the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court in the early 1930's was a very old and bit-
terly divided Court. The Justices polarized into two hostile camps.
The conservative faction was known as the "Four Horsemen" 72 and
consisted of Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Butler. The liberal faction consisted of Justices Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo, and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. The rift between
the two camps became so deep that each faction would meet outside
the court to solidify their positions. The "Four Horsemen" would all
ride to the Court together, while the liberal faction would meet
weekly at Justice Brandeis' apartment to plan strategy.
7 3
The "Four Horsemen" gained the upper hand with the ap-
pointment and conversion of Justice Owen Roberts into the conser-
vative fold. Justice Roberts provided the fifth and crucial vote which
allowed the conservative faction to declare unconstitutional many of
167. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446 (1978).
168. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), over.
ruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Adkins v. Children's Hospital
of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545-46 (1923).
169. 112 S. Ct. at 2863.
170. GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (11th ed. 1985).
171. BARBARA HABENSTREIT, CHANGING AMERICA AND THE SUPREME COURT 95-97
(1970). The author points out that in 1934, two years after Roosevelt's election into office,
557 basic codes had passed Congress. Id.




the President's New Deal programs.'74 Chaos would soon reign.
President Roosevelt became enraged at the Court's actions. The
Court was bombarded with criticism from all corners: the public, the
newspapers, labor leaders, scholars, and the Congress. 175 President
Roosevelt decided to strike back at the Court. On the pretext of
easing the workload of current Justices, and infusing "young blood"
into the judicial system, the President proposed to add one addi-
tional Justice for every member of the Court over seventy years of
age.176 Given the age of the members of the Court in 1937,
Roosevelt's plan would have meant the addition of six new Justices
bringing the number of Justices on the Court from nine to fifteen, in
effect, giving him complete control over the Court's ideological and
political composition. 77
President Roosevelt's plan produced public uproar. "[Als pre-
dicted, all hell [broke] loose. Aside from the major issue of judicial
independence, many people were angered by Roosevelt's emphasis
on the age of the judges. Everyone knew it was not their age, but
their opinions that had prompted Roosevelt's actions." 178 Attacks
against Roosevelt poured in from all sides, even from his own party.
His actions "hopelessly split the Democratic majority in the Senate;
caused a storm of protest from bench and bar; and created an uproar
among both constitutional conservatives and liberals." 79 The contro-
versy swelled, bringing Court legitimacy, existence, and independ-
ence to a precipice.
It became clear that the Court could not function in such tur-
moil. Either the President or the Court had to give. The Court did
just that when on March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,80
it overruled its prior opinion in Adkins v. Children's Hospital of
D.C. '' (applying the Lochner rationale to ban minimum wage laws)
and upheld the power of the government to pass minimum wage
laws. This decision was made possible when Justice Roberts, who
less than a year earlier had struck down similar requirements in
Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo,182 switched his vote from the
conservative to the liberal faction, creating a new five-man liberal
174. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935).
175. HABENSTREIT, supra note 171, at 113.
176. C. HERMAN PRITCT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS
AND VALUES 1937-1947 at 9 (1948).
177. Id. at 8.
178. HABENSTREIT, supra note 171, at 117.
179. Id.
180. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
181. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
182. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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coalition. Justice Roberts remained in the liberal camp, and the new
liberal coalition continually upheld New Deal legislation from that
point forward.'8
Newspapers and politicians boldly declared that the Court was
caving in under the pressure of Roosevelt's "Court packing" bill.
1
While history would later prove that Justice Roberts' decision in
West Coast Hotel was made two months prior to the date of the ac-
tual decision, and weeks before the announcement of Roosevelt's
Court packing plan,' 85 such disclosures did little to change public
opinion and perception.
Once Justice Roberts had switched sides, several older mem-
bers of the Court began to retire. 86 From 1937 to 1941, President
Roosevelt appointed seven new Justices (Black, Reed, Frankfurter,
Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes, and Jackson) which provided more than
ample security for the New Deal. Justice Roberts' decision in West
Coast Hotel, however, would forever be remembered, as future Jus-
tice Abe Fortas stated, as "the switch in time that saved nine."87
Thus, while the "switch in time" may be factually inaccurate,
this did little to change public perceptions, or enhance the institu-
tional integrity of the Court.1 88 Thus, it is a questionable assumption
that public perception and institutional integrity would be so irre-
trievably lost if the Court abandoned Roe; especially when one real-
izes that the West Coast Hotel Court's overt political/ideological ma-
neuvering combined with the Court's publicly perceived capitulation
in the face of President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, could not
shake public faith in the Court.
Similarly, the joint opinion's spin on Plessy v. Ferguson and
Brown v. Board of Education is interpretively questionable. In dis-
cussing Plessy, the joint opinion would have us believe that Plessy
was overturned solely because of changed facts or a changed under-
standing of facts (namely, that segregation did stamp a black child
183. See cases listed in supra note 42.
184. HABENSTREIT, supra note 171, at 121.
185. Id.
186. Justices Van Devanter retired in 1937, Justice Sutherland retired in 1938, and
Justice Brandies retired in 1939. Further, Justices Cardozo and Butler died in 1938 and
1939 respectively. GUNTHER, supra note 170, at app. B-4, B-5.
187. HABENSTREIT, supra note 171, at 123.
188. HABENSTREIT, supra note 171, at 95-138; TRIBE, supra note 26, at 66-68;
GUNTHER, supra note 170, at 122-25; HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 209 (2d. ed. 1985);
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, THE SUPREME COURT- JUSTICE AND THE LAW 22 (2d. ed,
1922); C. Herman Pritchett, The Chambermaid's Revenge, in HISTORIC U.S. COURT CASES:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 279 (John W. Johnson ed., 1992); see also TRIBE, supra note 167, at
448-49 (discussing, in capsule form, the extent and severity of public disfavor with the
West Coast Hotel Court's and President Roosevelt's activity).
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with a "badge of inferiority" which was found not to exist at the time
of Plessy). Such a reading is too confined. While the Brown Court
turned Plessy's factual assumption on its head, it can hardly be
overlooked that Plessy was abandoned because Plessy erroneously
concluded that "separate but equal" facilities passed muster under
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 9
Additionally, the joint opinion's belief that the populace un-
derstood these changed understandings is highly questionable. One
wonders how much of the South, in 1954, (and for that matter the
North) constituted what the joint opinion in Casey calls the
"thoughtful part of the Nation."'90 It seems, that a good portion of
the nation did not accept, let alone "understand" the fact that blacks
had been stamped with a "badge of inferiority." 9'
3. Unprincipled Lawmaking. In applying a rigorous stare deci-
sis test to Roe, the joint opinion failed to do the same to Akron.9 and
Thornburgh93. Indeed, the joint opinion believed that the decision in
Roe was so significant, and the controversy and debate surrounding
it so widespread, that it required more than a "normal" stare decisis
inquiry.'94 Judging by the joint opinion's treatment of Akron and
Thornburgh, the same may not be said of these two cases. Surely the
abortion regulations at issue in these two cases were as controver-
sial and intensely divisive as those in Roe. In fact, they must have
been since several of these regulations (i.e., the informed consent, re-
porting, and 24 hour waiting period provisions) were practically
identical to those controverted in Casey. Therefore, court legitimacy
189. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
190. 112 S. Ct. at 2813; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
191. The lack of understanding and acceptance of the Court's decision in Brown was
seen in many forms, ranging from continued attempts at dejure and de facto segregation
to Alabama Governor, George C. Wallace's, and Arkansas Governor, Orval Faubus', at-
tempts to personally and physically bar school integration to a general Southern attitude
that, to borrow from Andrew Jackson: Earl Warren has made his decision, now let him
enforce it. ISIDORE STARR, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 27-32 (1969);
TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE RoCK CRISIS 87-115 (1984); Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty
Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-9; David Luban, Legal Storytelling,
Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152, 2165-85 (1989);
see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1958).
192. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(invalidating those sections of Akron's Regulation of Abortions ordinance that concerned
parental consent, informed consent, 24 hour waiting period and the disposal of fetal re-
mains), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
193. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (invalidating provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act that con-
cerned informed consent), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
194. 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
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would have required adherence to Akron and Thornburgh as well as
Roe. However, there is no mention, or any indication, that any sort
of stare decisis analysis was done upon these two Supreme Court
precedents before the Casey Court so casually overruled them. In
fact, the Court's two overrulings are barely noticeable and do not oc-
cur until thirty-two pages into the opinion.195
The joint opinion's treatment of Akron and Thornburgh is de-
plorable. It is entirely unprincipled to invoke stare decisis to salvage
one precedent, and then ignore it in destroying two. It seems noth-
ing more than result-oriented. Furthermore, the joint opinion's en-
tire discussion of Akron, Thornburgh, Brown, and West Coast Hotel
is what Professor Shapiro would refer to as a "lack of candor."', Be-
fore overruling Akron and Thornburgh, the joint opinion utilized
these two cases to buttress its contention that Roe had not been un-
dermined. 197 Once finished, the joint opinion then overruled those
portions of Akron and Thornburgh which were inconsistent with the
joint opinion's interpretation of Roe. Further, by using Brown and
West Coast Hotel to shore up its legitimacy argument, the joint
opinion conducted a post-hoc rationalization of those decisions, each
of which are truly distinguishable from the issues in Casey.'98
To further shore up its legitimacy argument, the Court at-
tempted to distance itself from the appearance of succumbing to
political pressure or public whim. The joint opinion emphatically
contended that to overrule "under fire" is to weaken public confi-
dence in the Court and institutional integrity. What the joint opin-
ion failed to mention, or failed to realize, is that there are, of course,
at least two sides to any controversy. While the Court avoided the
appearances of illegitimacy that may have been caused by overrul-
ing, it failed to recognize that it succumbs to the same challenges of
illegitimacy by affirming "under-fire." To come down either way
would alienate all of the losing side's supporters. In choosing the
course it did, the Court became embroiled in exactly that which it
195. Id. at 2823. The joint opinion overruled Akron and Thornburgh with one terse
sentence:
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when gov-
ermuent requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading infor-
mation about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those
of child birth, and the "probable gestational age" of the fetus, those cases go too
far, are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important interest in po-
tential life, and are overruled.
Id.
196. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 732-38 ("[A] judge who believes that a particular
precedent can fairly be distinguished ... but who nevertheless describes it as
'controlling,' can properly be accused of lack of candor.").
197. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
198. See supra part III.A.2.
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sought to avoid: the appearance of unprincipled and judi-
cially-contrived, result-oriented judicial decisionmaking.
4. Confusion and Uncertainty. The joint opinion agreed that the
state of abortion law had become so confused and muddled that it
was impossible for lower courts to implement. In fact, this problem
was precisely one of the factors which led the Court to reconsider
Roe. 19  The Casey decision does little to alleviate this doubt and con-
fusion and facilitate lower court implementation of the rules an-
nounced. In fact, time will undoubtedly prove that the "undue bur-
den" standard is as malleable, if not more confusing, to abortion ju-
risprudence than the standard articulated in Roe.
According to Casey, state regulations restricting access to
abortion are unconstitutional if they "ha[ve] the principle purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion of a nonviable fetus." °0 "An obstacle is 'substantial'
we are told; if it is calculated[,] [not] to inform the women's free
choice [but to] hinder it."2' To assist lower courts in implementing
the new "standard," the joint opinion enunciated a presumably non-
exhaustive list of "guiding principles"" 2 which will certainly be more
difficult and confusing to implement than the Roe trimester frame-
work.20
3
As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, the "undue burden" stan-
dard will do nothing to prevent judges from "roaming at large in the
constitutional field guided only by their personal views."0 4 While the
Court has set up equally open-ended balancing tests for lower courts
to follow in other areas,0 5 the joint opinion's use of one here is trou-
blesome. Having cited confusion and uncertainty as a significant
part of the reason to reexamine Roe, 06 the joint opinion has done
little to ensure that the law will be more certain and less confusing.
More importantly, in light of the joint opinion's professed concern for
a woman's ability to order her life around the availability of abortion
procedures, the undue burden standard provides little stability. This
fact is demonstrated by Justice Stevens' concurring and dissenting
opinion in Casey, which argues that even under the joint opinion's
199. 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
200. Id. at 2820.
201. Id. at 2877 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 2821.
203. Id. at 2876-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 2866 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965)).
205. For a discussion of the application of balancing tests and their inherent prob-
lems, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 963-1005 (1987).
206. 112 S. Ct. at 2803-04.
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"undue burden" test, the informed consent and 24 hour waiting pe-
riod provisions of the Pennsylvania statute constitute "undue bur-
dens."2 °7 The joint opinion, of course, reached a different conclusion.
Consequently, in articulating the undue burden test, the joint opin-
ion simply added confusion to an already confusing issue. In his
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked, the "undue burden" test
"is a standard which is not built to last."20 8 At best, the "undue bur-
den" test is supported by only three Justices, and definitely "does
not command a majority of this Court."" 9 Obviously, such disagree-
ment does little to promote stability and predictability.
5. Intensely Divisive Controversies. In announcing its "intensely
divisive controversy" theory, the joint opinion was shirking its re-
sponsibility to interpret law. In essence, the Court refused to admit
error, or truly reexamine Roe as an original matter, because of pub-
lic protest. Lest it be forgotten, it is the Supreme Court's responsi-
bility to adjudicate "cases and controversies."21 The fact that there
is controversy surrounding a given law, that Justices have doubts
about the precedent's constitutional foundation, and that there is
widespread public and scholarly debate on the underlying issues, all
militate in favor, rather than against, reexamining the law as an
initial matter and not disposing of the issues by use of a mechanistic
judicial tool. Controversy does not give the Court license to simply
follow precedent merely because it is precedential. Justice Black, in
Francis v. Southern Pacific Co.,211 stated that: "[wihen precedent and
precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to support a
court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it. " 212
207. Id. at 2842-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The fact
is further illustrated in Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion in which he
traces Justice O'Connor's varying and confusing implementation of the "undue burden"
standard. Id. at 2878-79.
208. Id. at 2866.
209. Id. The authors of the joint opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
are the only three Justices to have adopted the "undue burden" test. Justices Blackmun
and Stevens would continue along the lines of the Roe trimester framework, subjecting
abortion regulations to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2839-40 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 2843-45 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and White would follow the plurality decision
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, subjecting abortion regulations to mere ra-
tional basis review. Id. at 2867.
210. U.S. CONST. art III; Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). The
"intensely divisive controversy" theory is truly one of the most disturbing aspects of
Casey. The theory's support for avoiding resolution of controversial issues flies in the face
of the Court's role as the independent, rational, and ultimate arbiter of constitutional dis-
pute. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
211. 333 U.S. 445 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 471.
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In Payne, when challenged that the Court was exercising power and
not reason, Justice Scalia explained that "[w]hat would enshrine
power as the governing principle of this Court is the notion that an
important constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational
support must be left in place for the sole reason that it once at-
tracted [a majority of the Court]." 3' Similarly, Justice Powell noted
that "[i]t is ... not only [the Court's] prerogative but also [its] duty
to re-examine a precedent [when] its reasoning... is fairly called
into question."214
In announcing its intensely divisive theory, the joint opinion
ignores constitutional history. While the Brown and West Coast Ho-
tel decisions would satisfy the joint-opinion's intensely divisive is-
sues test, other controversies apparently do not. Such analysis is
confined, if not questionable. The joint opinion, for example, makes
no mention of the Legal Tender Cases. The joint opinion avoids doing
so for two reasons. First, the Legal Tender Cases are usually men-
tioned in support of the Court's willingness to allow an erroneous
decision to stand because of the institutional, financial, and societal
reliance interests at stake.215 The joint opinion omits any discussion
of the cases because an inconsistency arises when one realizes that
the reliance interests at stake in the Legal Tender Cases are eco-
nomic and societal (what can only be referred to as traditional no-
tions of reliance), not social and individual. 16 Second, an examina-
tion of the Legal Tender Cases turns the joint opinion's intensely
divisive issues test on its head.
The mid to late 1800's found the Supreme Court engulfed in
controversy. During this period, two of the Court's the most contro-
versial decisions ever, were handed down. The first was the Dred
Scott decision217 which is now viewed as having made the Civil War
inevitable and brought about three amendments to the United
States Constitution.218 The second was the Legal Tender Cases. 9
213. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
214. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
215. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
217. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that no Negro,
free or slave, could be considered a citizen of the United States and declaring the Missouri
Compromise, which banned slavery in certain territories, to be unconstitutional).
218. DOROTHY TOMPKINS, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 153 (1959).
The Dred Scott decision is considered one of the Court's most disastrous decisions. The
Court, itself, was badly divided and muddled in its views. The case failed to resolve the
slavery issue, and the decision contributed to the onset of the Civil War. "Both the Civil
War and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment ... were needed to overcome the
Dred Scott ruling." JACK C. PLANO & MILTON GREENBERG, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
DICTIONARY 256 (8th ed. 1990).
219. Dred Scott and Legal Tender, while two distinct cases, must be read together
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"The battle over legal tender is one of the most famous in the
history of the United States generally as well as in its own judicial
history."220 There were three separate adjudications of the Legal
Tender Cases, but only two are relevant here: Hepburn v.
Griswold, 2 I and Knox v. Lee.222
The problem of paper currency dated back to the time of the
Framers and the Continental Congress. During the Civil and Revo-
lutionary Wars, the United States government was compelled to is-
sue paper money as legal tender to pay for the war effort. In a con-
temporarily interesting statement, one commentator noted that
"[tihere had always been a feeling in this country against paper
money, and this feeling had settled into a conviction in the most
conservative part of the community that the use of such money was
morally wrong. " 22 The Legal Tender Acts of 1862 and 1863, for the
first time, made paper money legal tender in the United States.
Support for these laws split deeply along party lines, with Republi-
cans in opposition and Democrats in support of the measures. Un-
derlying the political/ideological split were two diametrically op-
posed interest groups: those of the banks and those of the railroad-
ers.
Bankers held all of the major gold reserves in the country and
were in a very powerful economic position if paper money were pro-
hibited. The railroads, on the other hand, were in the midst of major
expansion. They had been forced to borrow heavily and were in des-
perate need of the legalization of paper money. "If they were re-
quired to pay their fixed charges or contracts in gold, they would be
so completely at the mercy of the banks that it would only be a short
time before the banks would own outright virtually every railroad
system."2 4
At the time of Hepburn v. Griswold, the Court consisted of
seven members. The majority in Hepburn, consisting of Chief Jus-
tice Chase, and Justices Nelson, Clifford, and Field held that the
and in context in order to understand its impact on what the Casey Court calls institu-
tional integrity and intensely divisive. For, as former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hugh-
es noted, "[ilt was during this period, while the Court was still suffering from a lack of a
satisfactory measure of public confidence, that another decision was rendered which
brought the Court into disesteem. I refer to the legal tender cases decided in 1870."
CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION,
METHODs AND ACHIEVEMENTs 51 (1928).
220. Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY vol. II at 151 (1932).
221. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), overruled by Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457
(1870).
222. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
223. BOUDIN, supra note 220, at 151-52.




Legal Tender Acts were unconstitutional. This decision sparked
heated dissent by Justices Miller, Swayne, and Davis. "Every news-
paper and politician subsidized by the railroad interests denounced
the decision, and conversely, the banking journals praised it ....
The bankers had won in the Supreme Court."
225
The Hepburn decision was, in fact, decided with two vacancies
on the Court. Only a few months prior to the Hepburn decision,
Congress had, on April 10, 1869, expanded the number of Supreme
Court Justices from seven to nine.226 The increased membership
gave President Grant the opportunity to fill two new vacancies. On
the day the Hepburn decision came down, the President nominated
William Strong and Joseph Bradley to fill the two empty seats. Both
Strong and Bradley were prominent Republican lawyers with very
strong railroad interests and ties. "It was alleged and not denied
[that] they were both interested as shareholders in the Camden and
Amboy Railroad Company. It was alleged that one or both of these
gentlemen had formerly been employed as law counsel by that com-
pany, and as such counsel had given opinions affirming the legal
tender to be constitutional."227
Four days after Justices Strong and Bradley were confirmed,
Attorney General Hoar, cognizant of the numerical and ideological
shift in the Court petitioned for reargument. Republicans and rail-
roaders threatened dire political and financial results if the Court
did not agree to reopen the issue. "[Nievertheless, the general public
had assumed that the question of constitutionality was to be consid-
ered as completely settled in the Hepburn Case."1 28 Hence, when the
Court agreed to reopen the case, the action produced public pro-
test.
229
With the additions of Justices Strong and Bradley, the outcome
was pre-ordained. Justices Strong and Bradley, in Knox v. Lee, sided
with the three dissenters from Hepburn, upheld the constitu-
tionality of legal tender, and overruled Hepburn. President Grant,
be it innocently or knowingly, had succeeded in "packing" the Court.
Such activity by the Court produced public outcry. In the words of
Chief Justice Hughes:
The action of the Court, taken soon after [Strong's and Bradley's] confir-
mation, in ordering a reargument of the constitutional question and then
deciding that the legal tender act was constitutional, the two new judges
joining with the three judges, who had dissented in the Hepburn case, to
225. Id. at 509-10; BOUDIN, supra note 220, at 154.
226. MYERS, supra note 224, at 514.
227. Id. at 523.
228. Boudin, supra note 220, at 158.
229. Id. at 157-58.
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make a majority, caused widespread criticism. From the standpoint of the
effect on public opinion, there can be no doubt that the reopening of the
case was a serious mistake and the overruling in such a short time, and by
one vote, of the previous decision shook popular respect for the Court.230
The reversal of Hepburn was overtly political and damaging to
the Court's reputation. "[Tihere is no doubt that ever since that era
the Court's action in reopening its first decision has been regarded as
a very grave mistake-and a mistake which for many years impaired
the people's confidence... in the impartiality and good sense of the
Court.""' Despite criticism from the press, public, Congress, and le-
gal profession, however, the Court re-examined Hepburn. Despite
alienating these same people by overruling Hepburn, and thereby
compromising the institutional integrity of the Court, the Court
eventually won them back.
The Legal Tender Cases, and other cases, including Brown and
West Coast Hotel, reveal a rather striking phenomenon in constituti-
onal history; namely, the inalienable-though sometimes waver-
ing-public faith in the Supreme Court and its role in the function-
ing of government. The Supreme Court has been the object of attack
throughout its history.1 2 "Jefferson retaliated with impeachment;
Jackson denied its authority; Lincoln disobeyed a writ of the Chief
Justice; Theodore Roosevelt proposed a recall of judicial decisions;
Wilson tried to liberalize its membership; and Franklin Roosevelt
tried to reorganize it. " "s Yet even though public perception and
court legitimacy were weakened by all the criticisms, challenges,
and protests, the Court has always emerged intact and powerful.
Chief Justice Hughes perceived this phenomenon over sixty
years ago when he stated:
When, however, we consider the hundred and thirty-six years of the
Court's activities, the thousands of its determinations, the difficult ques-
tions with which it has dealt, and the fact that it has come out of its con-
flicts with its wounds healed, with its integrity universally recognized,
with its ability giving it a rank second to none among the judicial tribu-
nals of the world, and that today no institution of our government stands
higher in public confidence, we must realize that this is due, whatever
may be thought as to the necessity of the function it performs, to the im-
230. HUGHES, supra note 219, at 52 (citations omitted).
231. BOUDIN, supra note 220, at 159 (citations omitted).
232. TOMPKINS, supra note 218, at 152 (citing Herbert Brownell Jr., The United
States Supreme Court: Symbol of Orderly, Stable, and Just Government, 43 A.B.A. J.
595-99 (1957); Robert E. Cushman, The History of the Supreme Court Resume, 7 MINN. L.
REV. 275-305 (1923); Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme
Court of the United States; A History of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 47 AMER. L. REV. 1-34, 161-89 (1963)).
233. Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
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partial manner in which the Court addresses itself to its never-ending
task, to the unsullied honor, the freedom from political entanglements and
the expertness of the judges who are bearing the heaviest burden of severe
and continuous intellectual work that our country knows.
234
This statement still applies today. The fact is that the Court
has always confronted "intensely divisive" controversies. While the
argument can be made that the abortion controversy is unprece-
dented, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to assess the "intensity"
of relative constitutional controversies through hindsight. The fact
remains that the Constitution requires the Court to decide contro-
versies, not shirk from them. If the reasoning or validity of a prece-
dent is called into question, the Court must reexamine it. 235 Thus, if
there is anything unprecedented about the abortion controversy, it is
the Court's treatment of it.
B. Casey's Inconsistency With Roe
1. Roe's "Central Holding." As Justice Scalia noted in his con-
curring and dissenting opinion, the joint opinion's reliance upon
stare decisis is, at best "contrived."3 6 While purporting to adhere to
the "central holding" of Roe, the joint opinion, in reality, emasculates
it. Justice Scalia is correct in asserting that, in essence, the majority
is adopting a "keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest"
version of stare decisis. 7 It is precisely this type of approach which
would, as Justice Scalia posited, justify the Court in stating that the
power of judicial review extends to only those statutes concerning
the jurisdiction of the courts. This, after all, was the "central hold-
ing" of Marbury v. Madison.3 '
In announcing its modified version of stare decisis, the joint
opinion held that stare decisis did not require adherence to Roe, but
only to its "central holding."29 In addressing the impropriety of ap-
plying stare decisis in such a manner, Justice Scalia commented that
under Roe the following were unconstitutional: (1) requiring that a
woman seeking an abortion be provided with truthful information
before giving her informed consent (if that information was designed
to influence her choice); (2) requiring information be provided by a
doctor, rather than by non-physician counselors; (3) a 24 hour wait-
ing period; and (4) requiring detailed reports about each woman who
234. HUGHES, supra note 219, at 55.
235. See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938).
236. 112 S. Ct. at 2881 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. Id.
238. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
239. 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
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seeks an abortion. ° Under Casey, each of these is now constitutio-
nal."l More importantly, under Roe a woman had a fundamental
right to abortion. Under Casey, she has only a "liberty", protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2
Roe v. Wade recognized that the right to abortion was funda-
mental and any restrictions on this right must survive strict scru-
tiny. State restrictions were permissible only when the State's inter-
ests became compelling. The trimester framework pinpointed the
stages at which various state interests became compelling.
Casey, by contrast, held that the trimester approach was not a
central or integral part of Roe. Additionally, according to the joint
opinion, state regulations impacting on the right to abortion were
not intended to be subject to strict scrutiny under Roe. Rather, the
joint opinion insists that Roe's central holding was "a recognition of
a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before viability, and to
obtain it without undue interference from the State."243 An analysis
of Roe shows that the Casey joint opinion's interpretation of Roe is
pure fallacy.
There is no mention of an undue burden test in the Roe opinion.
The joint opinion's conclusion that abortion regulations are permit-
ted throughout the pregnancy, provided they do not constitute an
undue burden, is clearly at odds with Roe. Even if one is willing to
concede that the trimester scheme was not central to Roe, one must
admit, however, that under Roe the State's interests in the period
after contraception and before viability were viewed as per se un-
compelling, therefore disallowing any restrictions on abortion, on
behalf of either the mother or the fetus. The majority simply
side-steps, or glosses over, this issue to reach its result.244
It seemed clear, at least to the majority in Roe, that abortion
regulations were to be subject to strict scrutiny because of the fun-
damental nature of the rights involved. As Justice Blackmun stated
in Casey, 'limitations on the right of privacy are permissible only if
they survive 'strict' constitutional scrutiny-that is, only if the gov-
ernmental entity imposing the restriction can demonstrate that the
240. Id. at 2881 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2860-61, 2878.
243. Id. at 2804.
244. The fact that Justice Blackmun, in Roe, mentioned that the state had an
"important and legitimate interest" in the mother and the potential life throughout the
pregnancy did not make it central to Roe's determination. Arguably, it was dicta. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). Yet, the joint opinion embraces the statement, consider-
ing it "central" to Roe's holding. While the State's interests were "important and legiti-
mate" throughout the pregnancy, it was only when the State's interest became
"compelling" that the State could intervene. Id. at 162-63.
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limitation is both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest."15 "We have applied this principle,"
Justice Blackmun argued, "specifically in the context of abortion
regulations."' In fact, in Akron, all of the Justices in the Roe ma-
jority, save Justice Stewart who had been replaced by Justice
O'Connor, explicitly rejected the undue burden analysis as incom-
patible with Roe."
In articulating Roe's "central holding", the joint opinion does
nothing more than restate Roe in the joint opinion's own words. The
purpose is clear. Roe must say what the joint opinion needs it to say.
In so doing, the joint opinion received disapproval from Justice
Blackmun, the author of the Roe opinion, who declared "the joint
opinion and I disagree on the appropriate standard of review for
abortion regulations."2 s The joint opinion's interpretation and im-
position of the undue burden standard is irreconcilable with Roe and
its progeny." To accommodate its interpretation, the Court re-
worded Roe and overruled anything inconsistent with the joint
opinion; namely, Akron and Thornburgh. The justifiable course of
action was to overrule Roe, not torture it to keep up an appearance
of fidelity to stare decisis.
Indeed, in rewording Roe, the joint opinion offended one of the
most traditional tenets of stare decisis-that the binding force of
precedent is attached not to the words chosen by a particular judge,
but to the actual principles necessary for the decision of the prior
case.250 The joint opinion's surgical removal of key words and find-
ings from the Roe opinion and subsequent reformulation come at the
expense of one of Roe's most basic premises-that only when the
State's interest becomes compelling are regulations permissible.
C. Casey's Misapprehension and Misapplication of Stare Decisis
1. The Scope of the Stare Decisis Inquiry. The joint opinion's
threshold inquiry into the scope of the stare decisis inquiry com-
prises a misunderstanding and misapplication of the doctrine. In
245. 112 S. Ct. at 2847.
246. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) ("[Wihere
certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative en-
actments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
We agree with this approach.") (citations omitted)).
247. City of Akron v. Akron Reprod. Health Servs., Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983)
(Powell, J., majority opinion, joined by Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and
Blackmun, JJ.).
248. 112 S. Ct. at 2845 n.1.
249. 410 U.S. at 155-56; see supra part H.A.
250. See text accompanying supra note 14.
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defining the issue, the joint opinion stated that it must answer four
questions: (1) Had Roe proven unworkable?; (2) Had reliance on Roe
made overruling impossible?; (3) Had any development in constituti-
onal law made Roe obsolete or a mere remnant of abandoned doc-
trine?; and (4) Had there been any change in Roe's factual findings
which rendered its central holding meaningless?25' According to the
joint opinion, the answers to these questions did not permit the
Court to overrule Roe.
Aside from being a non-exhaustive list of questions to be con-
sidered before overruling-and treating it as an all-inclusive one-the
questions the Court does consider are exploited. In analyzing the
first question, the joint opinion invoked the workability rule of Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,252 concluding that
"[allthough Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense proven
'unworkable.'"253 This conclusion, however, is at odds with the state
of abortion jurisprudence prior to Casey. In fact, the Roe decision
(most notably the trimester framework) had proven so confusing and
unworkable in practice that it was repudiated in Casey. Under Gar-
cia's "workability" rule,2" therefore, overruling Roe would have been
permissible. Furthermore, in invoking Garcia's workability rule, the
joint opinion failed to mention the fact that stare decisis permitted
the overruling of National League of Cities v. Usury,5 5 by Garcia,
because it had become apparent that National League of Cities had
departed from a proper understanding of the Constitution. Thus,
Garcia's support for overruling badly reasoned or erroneous deci-
sions was omitted from Casey, arguably because it applied Roe. This
is an argument the joint opinion did not want to address.
In analyzing the second question, the joint opinion looked to its
decision in Payne v. Tennessee256 in order to assess the reliance in-
terests at stake in Roe.257 The joint opinion noted that "the classic
case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier
rule occurs in the commercial context .... 8 What the joint opinion
fails to mention is that Payne overruled two prior decisions because
they were "wrongly decided" and involved constitutional precedent
which required a diminished stare decisis analysis.29 The citation to
Payne is inappropriate because Payne's discussion of reliance is
251. 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
252. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
253. 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
254. See supra note 128.
255. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
256. Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991); see supra note 131.
257. 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
258. Id.
259. 111 S. Ct. at 2610.
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dicta.26° If anything, Payne stands for the propositions that it is bet-
ter to be right than consistent, and that reliance interests may be
discounted if they do not arise in the commercial context.261 Thus,
the decision in Payne stands more appropriately for the proposition
that it is permissible to overrule erroneous precedent and accord co-
nstitutional precedent diminished stare decisis effect. A discussion of
these aspects of Payne in Casey is omitted because the same would
apply to their treatment of Roe.
With respect to the third question, analyzing Roe under a stan-
dard which permits overruling when precedent is "obsolete" or
"abandoned" is painfully extracted from prior decisions. While an
argument can be made that the joint opinion extracts an overly re-
strictive interpretation of prior decisions (i.e., that precedent be "no
more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine" before overruling),
such an argument becomes unnecessary when one realizes that
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (Patterson 11)262 (the case the joint
opinion relies upon in extracting this inquiry) involved a statutory
precedent and should therefore be treated differently from the con-
stitutional precedent at issue in Roe.263
Furthermore, in arguing that Roe had not been subsequently
weakened, the joint opinion clearly ignored the Court and acade-
mia's general repudiation of the legitimacy of substantive due proc-
ess.2 4 The joint opinion does not so much as mention, let alone con-
front, the argument that the Court's own decisions in Bowers v.
Hardwik 26 and Michael H. v. Gerald D.216 signal an abandonment
260. The Payne Court stated that in cases involving property and contract rights,
reliance interests are usually at their acme and require adherence to stare decisis. This,
however, was not applicable in Payne, since Payne involved merely "procedural and evi-
dentiary rules." Id.
261. See id. at 2609-10.
262. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
263. See supra part I.B.1.
264. See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). "Substantive due process" refers to the Supreme Court's
use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to articulate fundamental
values not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but thought to flow from it. In the
1900's, substantive due process was used to protect economic and property rights, and
was no better employed than in Lochner and no more discredited than in West Coast Ho-
tel. As Gunther notes, "[tioday, the use of substantive due process to give special protec-
tion to economic and property rights is discredited. Yet in recent years, substantive due
process has flourished once again, as a haven for fundamental values other than economic
ones." GUNTHER, supra note 170, at 432.
265. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the Federal Constitution does not confer a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy even in the privacy of one's
home).
266. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that an adulterous, biological father has no fun-
damental right to visit his child born into an intact marriage).
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of substantive due process-the theoretical foundation of Roe v.
Wade. The right to abortion, recognized in Roe, was a product of the
Court's deductions and extrapolations from a general fundamental
right to privacy.27 Placed along a continuum, Roe stands at the end
of a long line of cases recognizing fundamental rights to marriage,268
269 2 70raising children, procreation, ° and contraception. This line of
reasoning, however, ended with Roe. 2  Consequently, the joint
opinion's insistence that "[n]o evolution of legal principle has left
Roe's doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973 " 273 is pat-
ently false. The fact is Court acceptance of substantive due process
as a means of articulating fundamental values not specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution ended with Roe. Justice White's opinion
in Bowers v. Hardwick is a case in point. 4
In Bowers, the Court refused to extend the list of findamental
rights to include private, consensual homosexual sodomy.2 17 The
Court refused to do so because it risks violating its Constitutional
mandate to interpret laws when it begins to enumerate laws and
values with no foundation in the Constitution. 6 In so doing, the
Court, in effect, repudiated the underlying foundation for privacy,
namely, substantive due process. Bowers' holding, combined with
the subsequent Court rulings restricting the scope of the abortion
right (e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services) must lead even
the most staunch pro-choice supporter to conclude that there has
been some weakening of Roe's doctrinal foundation.
In analyzing the fourth question, the joint opinion admitted
that "time has overtaken some of Roe's factual assumptions."277 For
instance, the point of viability articulated in Roe no longer coincides
with medical reality.278 However, the joint opinion deemed these
267. See supra note 83.
268. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
269. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
270. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
271. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
272. The Bowers Court explicitly stated that the Court was no longer:
inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new funda-
mental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulner-
able and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.
478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
273. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
274. 478 U.S. at 194.
275. Id. at 189.
276. Id. at 191.




factual changes insufficient grounds to justify departing from Roe's
central holding. By discarding these changed factual underpinnings,
the joint opinion failed to realize that their actual holding flies in
the face of their entire discussion of Brown and West Coast Hotel. 9
If both Brown and West Coast Hotel stand for the proposition that
overruling is permissible if prior factual assumptions have changed,
and society understands these changes, then why doesn't the same
apply to Roe? Surely our society understands that advancements in
medical technology have and will continue to undermine Roe's fac-
tual assumption. Overruling Roe, therefore, was permissible even
under the joint opinion's post-hoc spin on Plessy and Lochner.50
2. Diminished Force. Missing from any part of the joint opin-
ion's analysis is a recognition of the diminished force with which
stare decisis applies in constitutional law. This is inappropriate, be-
cause Roe involves precisely the type of precedent about which Jus-
tice Brandeis voiced his concerns in Burnett.2 -'
First and foremost, Roe is demonstrably the type of constitu-
tional issue which is incapable of legislative correction. It is beyond
the power of the Congress to prohibit abortion. Consequently, the
only way to correct Roe, assuming that it was an erroneous decision,
would be through constitutional amendment. This laborious, unat-
tractive, and virtually impossible alternative was precisely the rea-
son why the Court, and various Justices, including Brandeis, Taney,
Stone, Cardozo, Strong, Douglas, and Jackson, have historically in-
sisted that constitutional precedents have diminished force under
stare decisis.282
The Casey Court, in refusing to consider or acknowledge this,
was clearly violating one of the most fundamental and traditional
tenets of stare decisis.2 3 It was also inconsistent with each of the
Casey Justice's prior treatment of constitutional precedent. 4 While
this is not to say that the Court had to overrule Roe, it should have
been a factor in its decision. Additionally, in ignoring the diminished
stare decisis effect afforded constitutional precedent, the joint opin-
ion offends the other justification for applying stare decisis with
279. See supra part Ifl.A.2.
280. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 23-37.
283. See supra note 24; LOUIS LUsKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?. A COMMENTARY ON THE
SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 292-93 (1975); Mason, supra note
48, at 193; ALPHEUS T. MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE
SOCIETY 22 (1959); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
16-17 (1969).
284. See supra note 66.
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varying force; namely, that affording a constitutional precedent too
much deference runs the risk of ensconcing a poorly reasoned, ar-
gued, or based decision into the law.285 Thus, failing to give Roe's co-
nstitutional precedent diminished stare decisis effect does not ade-
quately address, or protect against, this possibility.
3. It is Better to be Right than Consistent.28 It is simply wrong
to go on being wrong. This notion harkens back to Justice Brandeis'
statement that "it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right."287 While this phrase appears
inconsistent with the argument that it is better to overrule than
commit error, one must not take things out of context. Justice Bran-
deis did make that statement, but he attached a proviso: "provided
correction can be had by legislation." 8 Since this is a case where er-
ror cannot be corrected through legislation, it is one where even
Justice Brandeis would have been unwilling to ensconce error.
Many Supreme Court Justices have agreed that an erroneous
precedent should be corrected rather than perpetuated, including, at
one point or another, each of the Casey Justices. 2 9 In fact, such a
proposition predates Justice Brandeis. Justice Oliver Wendell Hol-
mes, in arguing for the reversal of Swift v. Tyson,50 stated that Swift
amounted to "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of
the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of
285. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. This may be the case with abortion
as there is considerable scholarly opinion that Justice Blackmun, in compiling his history
of abortion, relied primarily upon an article by Cyril Means which has been subsequently
refuted and discredited. See Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need
for a Life Protective Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1250, 1267-92 (1975); Joseph W. Del-
lapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITr. L. REV. 359,
379-89 (1979); Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in
History, Law or Logic in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds.,
1987); John R. Connery, The Ancients and the Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the
Court Ignored in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra; Joseph W. Dellapana, Abor-
tion and the Law: Blackmun's Distortion of the Historical Record in ABORTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra; Martin Arbagi, Roe and the Hippocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND
THE CONSTITUTION, supra.
286. Most commentators frame this proposition as a question, then proceed to de-
bate the advantages and disadvantages of being right and being consistent. While support
for both sides can be found, this article argues that the belief that it is better to be right
than consistent is the stronger argument, at least for constitutional precedent. This is
what Justice Brandeis argued when articulating the theory, and what many of the
Court's most prolific Justices argued when applying stare decisis. See supra note 24.
287. Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
288. 285 U.S. at 406.
289. See supra note 67.




opinion should make us hesitate to correct."291
Chief Justice Roger Taney, in the Passenger Cases,292 argued:
I... am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this
Court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always
open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and
that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force
of the reasoning by which it is supported.
293
Justice Sutherland recognized that Justices "are not infallible,
and when convinced that a prior decision was not originally based
on, or that conditions have so changed as to render the decision no
longer in accordance with, sound reason, [they] should not hesitate
to say so."
294
Justice Strong, in Knox v. Lee,295 the second Legal Tender deci-
sion which overruled Hepburn v. Griswold,296 held that not only in
cases involving constitutional precedents, but "[elven in cases in-
volving only private rights, if convinced we had made a mistake, we
would hear another argument and correct our error."2 97
Justice Reed, in Smith v. Allwright,298 which overruled Grovey
v. Townsend 299 stated that "when convinced of former error, this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.""'
Justice Douglas, in his work, Stare Decisis, asserted that
"[rlespect for any tribunal is increased if it stands ready not only to
correct the errors of others but also to confess its own. [It is] 'the
duty of every judge and every court to examine its own decisions...
without fear, and to revise them without reluctance."' 39 '
Justice Black, in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v.
Johnson, emphatically stated that a "constitutional interpretation
that is wrong should not stand."
30 2
291. B. & W. Taxi Co. v. B. & Y. Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justice Holmes' argument was, in fact, seized upon by Justice Brandeis in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the case which overruled Smith v. Ty-
son.
292. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
293. Id. at 470.
294. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 211 (2d ed. 1990).
295. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
296. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), overruled by Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12- Wall.) 457
(1870).
297. 79 U.S. at 554.
298. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
299. 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
300. 321 U.S. at 665.
301. Douglas, supra note 35, at 747 (quoting, in part, from Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y.
257, 261 (1850)).
302. 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
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Justice Stewart, in arguing to overrule Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,"'3 stated that the Court is correct in overruling erroneous
precedent and echoed Justice Frankfurter's belief that wisdom
should not be discarded merely because it comes late.0 4
Justice Powell, in his work Stare Decisis and Judicial Re-
straint, stated that "where it becomes clear that a wrongly decided
case does damage to the coherence of the law, overruling is
proper." 05
There is considerable scholarly support, as well, for the notion
that it is better to correct an erroneous precedent than to perpetuate
error.0 6 Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, in speaking about
the nominations of persons to the Court stated:
[T]hose candidates who would... refuse even to consider modifying...
Roe v. Wade ... simply because [it is an] established precedent], are...
unsuited for a seat on the Supreme Court .... Justices who look upon
precedents as divine edicts inscribed on stone tablets lack a sufficient ap-
preciation of the evolutionary nature of constitutional law. It is sometimes
more important that the Court be right than it be consistent.
3 0 7
The Supreme Court has consistently held that it is better to
admit and correct error, than to let it perpetuate and undermine the
law. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurring and dissent-
ing opinion in Casey, Roe erred when it classified a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy as a "fundamental right".8 The "right to
abortion" is not found in the longstanding traditions of our society,
nor is it found in the Constitution.309 Roe reached too far when it
analogized the right to abortion to the rights involved in the
Griswold line of cases.310 The court in Roe exceeded its authority and
violated its duty to interpret and not make the law when it consti-
tutionalized the right to abortion. Put simply, Roe was wrongly de-
cided. Overruling Roe, therefore, would not have been inconsistent
545, 575 n.1 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring).
303. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
304. Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 255 (1970) (Stewart, J.,
concurring), overruled by Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397;
see also Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
305. Powell, supra note 29, at 286.
306. See, e.g., Raol Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L.J. 723 (1991);
BORK, supra note 26, at 158; Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 345; Blaustein & Field, supra
note 26, at 183; Filippates, supra note 27, at 335; Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1349 (1990).
307. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 102 (emphasis added).
308. 112 S. Ct. at 2859-60.
309. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502, 520
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
310. 112 S. Ct. at 2860.
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with the Supreme Court's history of repudiating error.
4. Reliance. The joint opinion's emphasis on reliance interests is
both contrived and a misapplication of stare decisis. According to the
joint opinion, Roe could not be overruled because "for two dec-
ades.., people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their places in so-
ciety, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail."311 However, while some people have or-
dered their thinking around abortion as a fail-safe to defective con-
traception, this justification for keeping Roe is disingenuous. Even if
the Court was genuinely worried about reliance interests, the fact
remains that it is beyond the Court's power to declare abortion un-
constitutional or illegal. 12 As such, the impact upon reliance inter-
ests from overruling Roe would not have been grave. What the Court
fails to mention is that overruling Roe would not make abortion ille-
gal. There are currently seventeen states which are firmly commit-
ted to protecting a woman's right to abortion . 33 As such, abortion
would still be available in the United States. While it is likely that
some states will restrict or deny women access to abortion,314 it will
not be impossible to obtain one. While many will complain that the
burden of travel to an abortion state is too much to bear (and this
may in fact be the case), this is nonetheless an entirely valid
"fail-safe" for when contraception fails (the majority's purported
justification for reliance interests).
Furthermore, as shown in Part I, if society has substantially
relied on a precedent, such "reliance interests" militate against the
overruling of the prior decision. While the presence of reliance inter-
ests may permit adherence even to erroneous decisions, these occa-
311. Id. at 2809.
312. This is so for the same reason that it should be impossible for the Court to de-
clare abortion constitutional. The Constitution simply does not speak to abortion, and any
justification given for it is therefore contrived. The Court's only recourse when the Con-
stitution does not speak to an issue is to back out of the controversy and let the demo-
cratically elected branches decide.
313. These states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, New Jersey,
Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL ABORTION
RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION RIGHTS
182 (1991) [hereinafter WHO DECIDES?]; Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice
of Law: Abortion, The Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Fed-
eralism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 452 (1992).
Additionally, while Alaska, Delaware, Montana, and New Hampshire remain unde-
cided, they are clearly leaning in the same direction. WHO DECIDES?, supra.
314. These states include: Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
WHO DECIDES?, supra note 313, at 182. The remaining fifteen states are undecided. Id.
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sions are very limited.315 Additionally, the presence of widespread
controversy and opposition to a particular precedent weakens any
claim of reliance.31 6 For these reasons, according to Robert Bork, it
will never be too late to overrule the cases recognizing the right of
privacy, including Roe, "because they remain unaccepted and unac-
ceptable to large segments of the body politic, and judicial regulation
could at once be replaced by restored legislative regulation of the
subject."17
Bork is correct in asserting that the reliance interests impli-
cated by Roe are not sufficient to stay its repudiation as error. In the
first place, as discussed above, the repudiation of Roe would not ban
abortion, since the procedure would still be obtainable in many
states. Second, it cannot be said that society has detrimentally relied
upon the right to abortion because society as a whole, or even in part
(i.e., those who are pro-choice), has not dramatically altered its life
and thinking based upon the continued availability of abortion. Roe
has engendered fierce and unrelenting opposition in American law
since its inception. It has always been, and will remain, in a precari-
ous situation 1  Unless the pro-life movement dies down, Roe will
always be controverted. As such, one can never order their life on
the assurances that Roe will always be there. This is what the reli-
ance interest protects. This is what is clearly missing in Roe. Pro-life
supporters have always hoped, and pro-choice supporters have al-
ways feared, that one day Roe would be taken away.
Additionally, the joint opinion should once again be taken to
task for its lack of candor. The joint opinion makes a duplicitous at-
tempt to pigeon-hole Roe into the traditional reliance exception by
noting that for two decades of economic and social developments
people have ordered their lives around Roe's guarantees. 319 Such a
315. For example, Robert Bork argues that only when erroneous precedent has
"become so imbedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by society, so fundamental to
the private and public expectations of individuals and institutions, that the result should
not be changed now." BOPRK, supra note 26, at 158.
316. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
317. BORIl, supra note 26, at 158.
318. Unless, of course, the Congress or all fifty states codify the right to abortion.
The movement to codify Roe v. Wade is picking up momentum. The Freedom of Choice
Act of 1993, while still in committee, currently has 113 co-sponsors in the House of Rep-
resentatives (103 Democrats and ten Republicans) and forty-two co-sponsors in the Sen-
ate (thirty-seven Democrats and five Republicans). See H.R. 25, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); S. 25, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Congressional efforts to codify Roe reflect growing dissatisfaction with the Rehnquist
Court's declassification of Roe's fundamental right. The stated purpose of the act is to re-
store the trimester framework and "the strict scrutiny standard of review [as] enunciated
in Roe v. Wade and applied in subsequent cases from 1973 to 1988." Id.
319. 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
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statement is meant to place Roe among cases such as the Legal Ten-
der Cases, as instances where reliance interests are at their strong-
est. It is, however, impossible to determine or imagine what eco-
nomic reliance the joint opinion insists has accompanied Roe. One
thing is certain, however, it is not the right to receive free abortion,
or Medicare coverage.32 Similarly, the Court's attempt to character-
ize social developments as requiring adherence to Roe is unpersua-
sive. To give but one example, the Warren Court expressed no
qualms about instigating societal upheaval by ordering desegrega-
tion in Brown. If reliance interests did not prevent the overruling of
Plessy, it should not prevent the overruling of Roe.
Doctrines upon which long-standing social institutions, eco-
nomic theory, and criminal convictions were established have been
overturned. The overruling decisions have, in most cases, produced
significant upheaval and disruption-from the Legal Tender Cases
to West Coast Hotel to Brown and beyond. The potential for social
upheaval cannot justify the Court's abandonment of its responsibili-
ties.
In truth, the reliance exception for overruling precedent, as ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court, has basically been limited to the
commercial context.321 The joint opinion's attempt to extend this ex-
ception to the reliance interests at stake in Roe is inconsistent with
the traditional application of stare decisis and is unconvincing.
IV. THE FUTURE OF CASEY, STARE DECISIS, AND THE LAW
As Professor Schubert stated almost thirty years ago:
It would be misleading to assume that justices can neatly be classified as
either pro- or anti-stare decisis types .... They all follow precedent under
some circumstances. Indeed it is quite possible for opposing factions of the
Court to proclaim, both sincerely and vociferously, that they are each the
true followers of precedent. 22
These statements, while made in 1964, could not be more apro-
pos to the Rehnquist Court. Current Justices clearly flip-flop on the
applicability of stare decisis. When a Justice seeks to invoke the
doctrine, he or she speaks of "special justifications," "heavy bur-
dens," and "parades of horribles" in overruling. When a Justice
seeks to discard precedent, he or she speaks of diminished force, and
a prior lack of constraint in overruling a similar issue. It is hardly
uncommon to see each Justice take a position of a prior one (even if
320. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
321. See 112 S. Ct. at 2809; Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991); see
also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
322. SCHUBERT, supra note 35, at 217.
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inconsistent with the invoking Justice's natural inclinations or ide-
ology) when his or her interests-in overruling or adhering-are
best served. While such practice is by no means novel, it is also by
no means judicious.
At least for the short term, the Casey decision appears to have
some foundation as a fixture in time, if not law. It is obvious that
barring a "switch in time" the dissent is at least one vote shy of
overturning Roe v. Wade.32
President Clinton has already appointed one Justice to the Su-
preme Court, and it would appear that he may have the opportunity
to appoint at least one more. In obvious political maneuvering, Jus-
tice Blackmun stated in Casey that "I cannot remain on this Court
forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation process for my
successor well may focus on the issue before us today."32 4 Further-
more, Justice Stevens, a Ford appointee, but a frequent darling of
the liberal theorists, might view the Clinton years as the best period
in which to step down. While some will hope for a "mistake" equal to
those made by Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, 325 such an out-
come is improbable. 26
323. When the Casey decision was handed down, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia and Thomas were in favor of overruling Roe v. Wade. Since Casey,
was handed down, Justice White has retired and been replaced by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. While Justice Ginsburg has been critical of the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade, it appears that she is a strong supporter of a woman's right to abortion. See,
e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381-83, 385-86 (1985); William H. Freivogel, Ginsburg
Shows Liberal Stance in her Writings, ST. Louis DISPATCH, June 27, 1993, at Bi; Judge
Ginsburg Gives Little Sway at Hearings, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 2, 1993 at 5; Robin Toner, Die.
Hards in Opposite Camps on Abortion Fight Even After Battleground Deserts Them, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1993, § 4 at 3.
324. 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
325. By the term "mistake" I refer to judicial appointments made by the President
which resulted in Supreme Court Justices who became antithetical to, or at least not
what was expected of, the President who appointed them. It is reported that Eisenhower
later admitted to making two mistakes as President, both of which were seated on the
Supreme Court [Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan]. See generally
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREMiE COURT 41 (3d ed. 1989); TRIBE, supra note 26, at 51.
Similarly, it would seem that President Nixon's appointment of Justice Harry Blackmun
may now be viewed in a similar light.
326. As at least one commentator has suggested, President Clinton has expressed no
qualms about nominating a Justice committed to Roe v. Wade. See Bruce Fein, Clinton's
Penchant to Pack the Court, WASH. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at F1; Fein, supra note 157, at
22. In fact, during the campaign, President Clinton, while disavowing any so-called litmus
test, stated:
I wouldn't appoint someone who has a view of the Constitution [like] Professor
[Robert] Bork and Judge [Clarence] Thomas.... [I would make sure, however,
that t]hey have an expansive, broad view of the Bill of Rights, that they believe
in the right to privacy, they believe that the right to privacy includes a woman's
right to choose.
Lastly, while Chief Justice Rehnquist has, like Justice Black-
mun, stated that he cannot remain on the Court forever, it seems
unlikely that he would let a Democratic President fill his vacancy,
and monopolize his Court.
A. The New Centrists
The question immediately raised by the Casey decision was
what effect would the new centrist coalition, consisting of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, have upon the Court. Many viewed
the joint opinion in Casey as marking the beginning of the emer-
gence of a bloc of what might best be called "legal conservatives."327
These "legal conservatives" seemed to be characterized by a moder-
ate, but generally conservative outlook, and a substantial respect for
precedent. These Justices seemed to occupy a "centrist" position on
an ideological scale, featuring Justices Stevens and Blackmun on
the left and Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Thomas,
Scalia on the right.
Others viewed the new centrist coalition as temporary. The
joint opinion in Casey was viewed as having sufficed for the moment,
but was not built to last. As Robert Bork noted, "[n]o bloc votes as a
unit all the time.""2 ' Indeed, prior to Casey, the three centrists had
"rarely, if ever taken a similar tone in their own opinion."
3 29
The statistics from the 1992-93 term show that the new centrist
coalition is disintegrating. "In the areas of civil rights, church-state
separation, voting rights and others, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy returned to the conservative fold .... "330 More surprising,
Justice Souter appears to have undergone a liberal transformation
this past term, "moving a visible notch to the left, in subjects that
range across the board."
331
In non-unanimous decisions this past term, the centrist coali-
tion disagreed more often than it stood together. 32 The voting
alignments from the 1992-93 term showed that Justice O'Connor
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agreed most often with Justice Thomas (85% of the time); Justice
Kennedy agreed most often with Chief Justice Rehnquist (90% of the
time); and Justice Souter agreed most often with Justices White and
Scalia (81% of the time).333 Thus, from all appearances, the centrist
coalition appears to be no more.
It is unclear what effect the addition of Justice Ginsburg will
have upon the Court, and specifically, the "legal conservatives."
Prior to her appointment, Justice Ginsburg was touted as a moder-
ate centrist and a coalition builder. 4 Conceivably, Justice Ginsburg
could bridge the gap between the splintered centrists thereby creat-
ing a powerful four-Justice coalition. As Professor Tribe noted, "[t]he
Ginsburg nomination now takes on more importance than people
originally assumed."335 Similarly, Professor Gunther forecasted that
Justice Ginsburg will fit in well with the newly emergent centrist
bloc. "Her track record on the D.C. Circuit, which was just as ideo-
logically split (as is the Supreme Court), was that of a peace maker.
She was the bridge between left and right."36 How she will vote on
the Supreme Court, of course, remains to be seen.
Surprisingly, Justice Ginsburg's thirteen years on the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals provide little insight as to how she will vote on
the major issues of the day, and how she will employ stare decisis.
Testimony given at her confirmation hearings, however, reveals that
she will accord substantial weight to Court precedent. During her
confirmation hearings, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would be
"scrupulous in applying the law on the basis of legislation and
precedent."337 In discussing her criteria for overruling precedent,
Justice Ginsburg commented:
The soundness of the reasoning is certainly a consideration, but it
shouldn't mean that we abandon a precedent. Justice Brandies said some
things are better settled, and especially when the legislature sits. So if
we're talking about a precedent that has to do with the construction of a
statute-stare decisis-its more than just the soundness of the reasoning.
It is-the reliance interests are important, the stability, certainty,
predictability of the law.338
In the same vein, Justice Ginsburg indicated that she recog-
nized and agreed with the distinction between constitutional and
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statutory precedent articulated by Justice Brandies in Burnett.
However, she commented that "one doesn't lightly overrule prece-
dent in the constitutional arena either."3 ' Rather, before overruling
precedent, a Judge should consider if any reliance interests have
been built up around it. 4' Thus, to the extent she practices what she
preached at her confirmation hearings, her respect for precedent
would mesh well with that of the other so-called centrists. 41
B. The Law
All members of the current Court have recognized that the re-
straints upon stare decisis are weakest in cases involving
constitutional precedent.3 42 This, combined with traditional conser-
vative respect for precedent, 43 has led to a weakening, but few over-
rulings, of prior activist decisions such as Roe.3 " This signifies a
Court majority "in favor of shielding pivotal jurisprudential doc-
trines endorsed in prior activist decades from further scrutiny."345 In
Casey, this was precisely the point stressed by the joint opinion in
refusing to depart from Warren and Burger Court precedents de-
spite arguable error. Consequently, the great collision between
activist precedent and conservative jurisprudence was upstaged by
the emergence of a passive group of centrists.
As Professor Robert A. Sedler believes, the centrists "are not
likely to extend the precedents of the Warren and Burger courts, nor
are they likely to make radical departures."346 This means, as Bruce
Fein observes, continued-but no doubt slightly altered-life for ac-
tivist precedents affirming criminal convictions, police interrogation,
one-person/one-vote, libel laws, and racial and gender preference
rulings. 47 This also means, however, that certain controversies will
find no solace in this Court.3 48
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Application of stare decisis does not come without its problems.
As this paper shows, it may interfere with the Supreme Court's duty
to settle important questions; and it often produces conflict and a
lack of clarity. This is not necessarily an infirmity of the doctrine,
but rather a cold fact that as the number of cases increases almost
exponentially each year, so do the number of precedents which these
decisions generate. Thus, with the increased number of available
precedents, so increases the possibility of doctrinal inconsistency
and conflict.4 9
The joint opinion's use of stare decisis in Casey was overtly po-
litical, and therefore, deplorable. Some have argued that such an
outcome is inevitable because:
The reason, quite simply, is that the Court can find previous discussions
on most matters which support equally well either side of the issue.
[Pirecedents are by no means absolute barriers to the exercise of discre-
tion and the making of policy. It is no breach of judicial etiquette for the
Court to distinguish, limit, ignore, or overrule precedents relevant to the
resolution of a given issue. In sum, the judicial decision appears in a form
which on its face seems to possess an aura of objectivity, but in reality al-
lows its author virtually untrammeled discretion.
3 50
Dangers lurk in other areas as well. The reliance exception to
abandoning stare decisis is troubling because it subordinates one's
constitutional rights to the expectations of others. The "intensely
divisive controversies" exception to abandonment of stare decisis is
problematic because it encourages the Court to abandon its duties
and obligations. The "exercise of reasoned judgment" and "lesser
sources of legal principle" theories are disturbing because it gives
impetus to, value-laden constitutional interpretation. The fear of
overruling "under fire" is pernicious because it grounds decisions of
law on the basis of public opinion. The ability to re-write past deci-
sions to conform to notions of stare decisis is deadly because it
usurps the rule of law.
Stare decisis is vital to the functioning of the Court. Yet, the
doctrine is prone to abuse. The trick is to find a definition of stare
decisis which comports with the rule of law and prevents abuse.
For most of us, the proper role of precedent in constitutional adjudication
must cease their activities in order to serve their cause, because their protests will only
cement in place a decision which by normal standards of stare decisis should be
reconsidered." 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
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will be found at the end of a middle road. The nation needs and deserves
to have a steady hand at the Constitution's wheel, but the Supreme Court
occasionally must overrule its earlier cases because legislative correction
of a constitutional decision is all but impossible.
35 1
Such an outcome is possible if judges adhere to the traditional
notions of American stare decisis: it applies to all principles of law
necessary to the determination of the prior case; it applies with di-
minished force in constitutional law; it permits departure or, at the
very least, reconsideration when precedent has become unworkable,
factually different, eroded, inconsistent in application, abandoned,
or erroneous.
The Casey Court's use of stare decisis has done nothing to end
the abortion controversy or remove the doubts and confusion sur-
rounding the right to abortion. The application of stare decisis to
abortion, at least by this Court, has proven incoherent and inconsis-
tent. Clearly, the Casey Court should have met the task presented.
It could have reconsidered Roe, removed itself from this nasty con-
troversy, and put the ultimate decision on abortion where it rightly
belongs-with the people. But it chose not to, and for this, it is deserv-
ing of criticism.
For as Justice Scalia stated in his dissent, while it is no doubt
true that liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,
"[r]eason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion."35
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